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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The following were the original parties in the case below: 
Plaintiff: Brighton Corporation. Mary Moreton Barton was at all times a principal 
officer of Brighton Corporation. 
Defendants: Isabel M. Coats, Walter M. Coats, Gregory M. Ward, Doug's Tree Service, 
Inc. 
Mr. and Mrs. Coats, as trustees of the Isabel M. Coats Trust, owned the property in 
question at the time the case was filed. Mr. Ward, one of Mrs. Coats' sons, and a beneficiary of 
the Isabel M. Coats Trust, subsequently acquired the property. Brighton Corporation prosecuted 
no claims against Isabel Coats, Walter Coats, or Doug's Tree Service, other than to obtain the 
initial preliminary injunction. The only parties at trial were Brighton Corporation and Mr. Ward. 
"Brighton Group" has never been a party in the case. Mr. Ward testified at a hearing on 
July 13,1995 that "Brighton Group is going to consist" of five members of the Ward/Coats 
family and their families. However, Brighton Corporation's research indicates that while there 
are two entities using variations of the name "Brighton Group," neither appears to have any 
connection to Mr. Ward, Mr. and Mrs. Coats, or any other Ward/Coats family member. Ward's 
statement that "Brighton Group" has an interest in the property raises the question of whether 
Ward is in fact the real party in interest and whether there are other entities or individuals who 
should be joined as parties pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 19. R. 1753:18-19. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)0). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court erred in holding that the settlement agreement 
entered into on March 3,1999 by stipulation in open court was a binding contract. 
Standard of Review: This is a mixed question of fact and law, with subsidiary 
factual findings reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard and legal conclusions 
reviewed under the de novo standard. Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 865 
P.2d 1373, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Therefore, the standard of review varies 
depending on the specific decision being reviewed. However, the interpretation of a 
stipulation requires a more deferential review. See Kroupa v. Kroupa, 574 N.W.2d 208, 
215 (S.D. 1998) (Sabers, J., concurring and dissenting) (suggesting that a district court's 
interpretation of a settlement stipulation in open court is "precisely the type of 
determination that normally receives a deferential, abuse of discretion review"). 
2. Whether the district court erred in summarily enforcing the stipulated 
settlement by allowing Brighton Corporation (sometimes referred to herein as 
"Brighton") to pave its right-of-way across the Subject Property. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. "The decision of a trial court to 
summarily enforce a settlement agreement will not be reversed on appeal unless it is 
shown that there was an abuse of discretion." Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, 
Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
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3. Whether the district court erred in granting a partial summary judgment (1) that 
it was reasonable for Brighton, as a condition of reviewing future plans, to require 
reimbursement of professional costs incurred in plan review; (2) that it was reasonable 
for Brighton to require that all plans submitted for review be signed by a licensed 
architect; and (3) that it was reasonable for Brighton to consider the Foothills and 
Canyons Overlay Zone ordinance ("FCOZ") for comparison in reviewing plans submitted 
by Defendant Gregory M. Ward ("Ward"), subject to Ward's right to challenge at trial the 
application of specific provisions of FCOZ. 
Standard of Review: The standard in reviewing an order granting summary 
judgment is correctness. However, in this case the standard of review is ultimately 
deferential because the issue before the district court was whether Brighton's three 
proposals for guiding its review were reasonable under the circumstances. See Rhue v. 
Cheyenne Homes, 449 P.2d 361, 362-63 (Colo. 1969) (rejection of building plans subject 
to review will be upheld unless unreasonable). 
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to consider at trial 
Ward's October 1999 Plans, submitted for Brighton's review shortly before trial. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. United States v. Rhynes, 206 F.3d 349 
(4th Cir. 1998) (court's interpretation of its own scheduling order is reviewed under the 
standard of abuse of discretion); In re VMS Sees. Litig., 103 F.3d 1317 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(same). 
5. Whether the district court erred in determining at trial that the June 1999 Plans 
did not comply with the stipulated settlement agreement. 
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Standard of Review: This is a mixed question of fact and law. Factual 
determinations are overturned only if clearly erroneous, while legal conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness. See authorities cited on p. 1 supra. 
6. Whether the district court erred in disallowing the testimony of Carl Eriksson. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1361 
(Utah 1993). 
7. Whether the district court erred in holding that Brighton did not unreasonably 
withhold its consent to plans which were at issue at the July 13, 1995 hearing. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. The question before the court was 
whether the preliminary injunction should be vacated to allow Ward to build. Denial of a 
motion to vacate a preliminary injunction is reviewed under the standard of abuse of 
discretion. Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 90 (Utah 1992); Securities and 
Exchange Common v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 679 (10th Cir. 1988). 
8. Whether Judge Leslie A. Lewis, the chief judge of the Third District Court, 
erred in denying Ward's motion to recuse the trial judge, Judge David S. Young. 
Standard of Review: Correctness. S.L. v. State (ex rel. M.L.), 965 P.2d 551 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or 
criminal, or his attorney, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before 
whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, 
either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the 
suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call in another judge 
to hear and determine the matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief 
that such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after 
the case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known. If the judge 
against whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, 
he shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to 
another judge (naming him) of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, 
which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. If the 
judge against whom the affidavit is directed does not question the legal 
sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified 
finds that it is legally sufficient, another judge must be called in to try the case 
or determine the matter in question. No party shall be entitled in any case to 
file more than one affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be filed unless 
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and 
application are made in good faith. 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(l)(a) 
E. Disqualification. 
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not 
limited to instances where: 
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a 
party's lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, or 
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding... . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Brighton Corporation, a non-profit family corporation, filed this action to stop 
Ward from building a large cabin in Brighton, Utah that violated restrictive covenants 
burdening land ("the "Subject Property") then owned by Ward's parents, Isabel M. and 
Walter M. Coats, as trustees of the Isabel M. Coats Trust. Brighton originally conveyed 
the land to the Coats Trust by a Special Warranty Deed that (1) reserved several rights-
of-way and easements across the Subject Property, (2) limited any improvement on the 
Subject Property to a single dwelling consisting of two floors, each not to exceed 1200 
square feet, and (3) gave Brighton a discretionary right to review and approve the 
placement and plans for any structure. Exh. 44-D. (A copy of the Special Warranty 
Deed is included in the Addendum as Exhibit A.) Ward has submitted numerous cabin 
plans that do not comply with the restrictive covenants or a subsequent settlement 
agreement between the parties. Brighton has refused to approve Ward's noncompliant 
plans, and its decisions were consistently vindicated by the district court. Rather than 
comply,1 Ward now appeals several adverse district court determinations and asks this 
Court to replace the trial judge. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Brighton initially filed this action and obtained a preliminary injunction after Mary 
Barton, Brighton's president, unexpectedly came upon Ward as he was starting 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
construction on a large cabin — by cutting down several mature trees — without first 
obtaining Brighton's approval of his plans as required by the Special Warranty Deed. 
The preliminary injunction, dated October 4, 1994, included findings that, among other 
things, Ward's building plans were "intentionally ambiguous as to the type of structure 
actually being proposed, and as to its placement on the Subject Property," and that the 
restrictions had been imposed to assure construction of only a small cabin. Order 
Granting Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Judgment dated October 4, 1994 
("October 1994 Order") (Addendum Exh. B) at fflf 13b, 15. The injunction barred Ward 
from going forward on the plans at issue, but allowed him to return to court if Brighton 
unreasonably withheld its consent to "new and different" plans. October 1994 Order, 
Addendum Exh. B, at 120. 
Thereafter, Ward submitted additional plans for Brighton's review. However, the 
plans did not comply with the restrictive covenants of the Special Warranty Deed. 
Among other things, Ward's plans continued to be ambiguous as to the number of floors 
and placement on the Subject Property, and also showed a 31-foot high roofline. 
Brighton rejected them, at the same time suggesting an acceptable style, one that 
complied with the intent of the restrictions as construed by the district court. After an 
"emergency" evidentiary hearing held on July 13, 1995 at Ward's request, the district 
court rejected Ward's application for a determination that Brighton had unreasonably 
The irony of this suit, which has gone on for six years at great expense, and this appeal, 
is that it has always been in Ward's hands to make the necessary changes, described in 
detail in letters from Brighton Corporation, to get a cabin built. 
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withheld its consent. Order Denying Application for Determination that Approval has 
been Unreasonably Withheld (R. 467-68) (Addendum Exh. C). 
After the July 1995 evidentiary hearing, Ward submitted additional plans, all of 
which contained essentially the same defects. Brighton continued to review the plans, 
identify the flaws, and reject them. In May 1996, Ward asked for another "emergency" 
hearing. The district court, however, instructed the parties to prepare for trial rather than 
annually request an evidentiary hearing on short notice. A trial date was then set in 1997. 
In May 1997, shortly before the final pretrial conference, Ward moved to recuse 
the district judge assigned to the case (the Honorable David S. Young) on grounds that 
Brighton's lead counsel, James S. Jardine, had signed an advertisement supporting Judge 
Young during his retention campaign the previous year. This motion was promptly 
referred to the chief judge of the Third District Court (the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis), 
who received full briefing and then issued a written ruling denying it. Court's Ruling 
dated June 9,1997 (R. 718-21) (Addendum Exh. D). 
In early 1999, the district court granted Brighton a partial summary judgment, 
consistent with Brighton's discretionary right to review Ward's plans, (1) that it was 
reasonable for Brighton to charge Ward, on a going forward basis, for professional costs 
of plan review with the reasonableness of the charges to be reviewed at trial; (2) that it 
was reasonable for Brighton to require that Ward's plans be signed by a licensed 
architect; and (3) that it was reasonable for Brighton to consider the provisions of Salt 
2
 The order did not state that Ward "must compensate Brighton for all further costs," as 
Ward represents, or award attorney's fees to Brighton. 
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Lake County's Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone ordinance ("FCOZ") in reviewing 
Ward's plans, subject to Ward's right to challenge the application of specific FCOZ 
provisions at trial. Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 1185-88) 
(Addendum Exh. E). 
On March 3, 1999, the previously scheduled date for trial, the parties stipulated in 
open court to a settlement reflecting, among other things, specific objective criteria on 
which approval would be granted and resolution of certain other matters, such as paving 
an existing road on the property for safety reasons. Both Mrs. Barton (for Brighton) and 
Ward were placed under oath, agreed to the stipulated terms of the settlement agreement, 
and swore to implement the terms of the agreement. The trial date was stricken. The 
parties obtained a new trial date in the event Ward failed to submit plans that complied 
with the settlement or that Brighton refused to approve plans that did comply therewith. 
Transcript of Hearing, March 3, 1999 (Exh. 1-P) (Addendum Exh. F). Thereafter, Ward 
submitted plans on April 9, 1999 which did not comply with the settlement agreement 
and were rejected by Brighton. 
On September 3, 1999, Brighton filed a motion to summarily enforce the 
settlement agreement and specifically for permission, pursuant to the settlement 
agreement and for safety reasons, to pave the right-of-way crossing the north end of the 
Subject Property. Ward claimed the agreement was not binding and that Brighton did not 
have the right to pave the road. Because the roadway needed to be paved for safety 
reasons before the onset of winter weather and because Ward's attorney insisted he was 
unavailable for an early hearing date, the motion as to that issue was considered and 
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orally granted at a pretrial conference with all counsel present on September 8, 1999. 
Ward's objections were overruled and Brighton was authorized to pave the road by order 
dated September 21, 1999. Order Allowing Plaintiff to Pave Private Roadway (R. 1392-
94) (Addendum Exh. G). Furthermore, after a hearing on October 22, 1999, the court 
held that the settlement agreement was enforceable. Order Granting Brighton's Motion 
to Enforce Settlement Agreement (R. 1417-18) (Addendum Exh. H). Accordingly, the 
issue at trial was whether Ward's plans complied with the settlement agreement. 
C. Disposition in the Court Below. 
The case was tried to the court on November 17-19, 1999. After hearing 
testimony from the parties and their architects, the court ruled that the plans Ward 
submitted pursuant to the settlement agreement were not final and did not comply with 
the terms of the agreement. Order dated February 3, 2000 (R. 1690-93) (Addendum 
Exh. I). 
D. Statement of Facts. 
1. The Moreton Family Cabin at Brighton, Utah. 
In 1941, Fred and Sarah Moreton acquired property in Brighton, Utah. 
R. 1743:45, 75. There was an existing cabin (sometimes referred to hereinafter as the 
"Family Cabin") on the property that Fred and Sarah Moreton enjoyed with their 
children, Isabel Moreton Coats, Mary Moreton Barton (now president of Brighton 
Corporation), Sarah Moreton Kunz, Ed Moreton, and Fred Moreton. R. 1743:46, 75. In 
1969, Fred and Sarah Moreton conveyed the property to Brighton Corporation, a family 
corporation, and gave each of the five siblings one-fifth of the corporate stock. Id. 
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2. The Siblings Divide the Property to Prevent Overuse. 
In 1990, the five Moreton siblings met and, in a series of discussions, decided to 
divide up the assets of Brighton Corporation. The Family Cabin was in disrepair, it was 
not clear who was responsible for upkeep, and it was difficult to use it with the siblings' 
children and grandchildren. R. 1743:47, 75. The siblings decided to divide the land up 
into three parcels. The main parcel, which would remain in Brighton Corporation, was to 
include the Family Cabin and have no restrictions, while two smaller parcels would have 
restrictive covenants in favor of the main parcel. It was planned that only one of the 
siblings would end up with the main parcel and Family Cabin, in the belief that such 
restriction was necessary to provide for reasonable use of the property. There were 
simply too many family members to continue to hold the Family Cabin in common. Id. 
The siblings assigned a value of $268,000 to all of Brighton Corporation's assets, 
so that the value assigned to each sibling's stock was $53,600. R. 1743:48, 75. The main 
parcel, with the Family Cabin, was valued at approximately $208,000, and the two 
smaller, restricted parcels were valued at $50,000 (the "East" parcel) and $10,000 (the 
"West" parcel, or "Subject Property"), respectively. The siblings believed the Subject 
Property was worth only $10,000 because it was burdened by right-of-way, utility, and 
waterline easements, it had no water share, it was smaller than the other parcels, and it 
was subject to restrictive building covenants in favor of Brighton Corporation. 
R. 1743:79-80. Nevertheless, it was felt that a small cabin could be placed on the Subject 
Property where the garage for the Family Cabin had been located. Id. The siblings 
believed that any cabin on the Subject Property should be small so it would not obstruct 
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the view or value of the main cabin and to avoid large numbers of people on the property 
(which was the reason for dividing the family property). R. 1743:80-81, 88-89. 
The five siblings then drew numbers out of a box to divide the assets. 
R. 1743:48, 75. Isabel, as the oldest, picked first, but drew the final choice. Mary 
Moreton Barton drew the first choice and elected to purchase all of the stock of Brighton 
Corporation, which included ownership of the main parcel and Family Cabin with the 
corresponding duty to pay the others for their stock. R. 1743:48-49, 75. Fred Moreton 
drew the second choice and selected the East parcel. He received a deed for the land and 
$3,600 (from Mary Barton). Id. Ed Moreton drew the third choice and chose to receive 
$53,600, rather than $43,600 and the Subject Property. Id. Sarah Moreton Kunz drew 
the fourth choice and also chose to receive $53,600. Id. Isabel Moreton Coats drew the 
final choice. She received the Subject Property and $43,600 from Mary Barton. 
R. 1743:50,75. 
Upset with the results of the drawing, Isabel Coats was emotionally distraught 
after the meeting and had to be helped from the room. R. 1743:86. However, before 
leaving, she asked the others to let her know if they heard of land or a cabin for sale at 
Brighton. Id. In a subsequent letter to Mary Barton, Isabel Coats stated, "Hopefully we 
may have a small place [on the Subject Property] within a couple of years." R. 1743:86-
87. 
The Ward/Coats family did not remain reconciled to "a small place." This dispute 
arises out of their disappointment at not getting the main parcel with the Family Cabin, 
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and their subsequent efforts, in violation of the restrictive covenants in the Special 
Warranty Deed, to build a large cabin on the Subject Property. 
3. Restrictions on the Subject Property. 
The Subject Property was conveyed by Brighton Corporation to the Coats Trust by 
a Special Warranty Deed dated July 3, 1991. Exh. 3-P. The Special Warranty Deed 
reserved for Brighton an easement across the Subject Property for roadway and utility 
purposes and also reserved a separate permanent waterline easement where the existing 
waterline to the main cabin crossed the Subject Property. The Special Warranty Deed 
also reserved an additional waterline easement in favor of the Silver Lake Company 
running north and south just inside the western border. Id. 
The Special Warranty Deed contained the following restrictions on any proposed 
structure: 
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS. The above-described premises shall 
be limited to the construction of a single residential building containing not 
in excess of twelve hundred square feet on each floor, and containing not 
more than two floors. Outside decking not under any roof shall not be 
included in said twelve hundred square foot limitation. 
Grantor expressly reserves the right to review and approve the 
proposed placement, plans, and designs for any improvements to be located 
upon the above-described property, which approval shall be timely and 
shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
Addendum Exh. A at 2. The two-floor limitation referred back to the design (though not 
the size) of the Family Cabin, which had two floors, with the lower floor built into the 
side of the mountain so that from the uphill side the main cabin appeared to have only 
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one floor. The entrance to the Family Cabin was on the downhill side, where the first 
floor was on grade. October 1994 Order, Addendum Exh. B at 7, f 14. 
4. Brighton Seeks Injunction to Stop Unauthorized Construction. 
On August 29,1994, Mary Barton, while on a visit to the Family Cabin, heard the 
sound of heavy machinery on the Subject Property. She investigated and discovered that 
Defendant Doug's Tree Service was cutting down large, mature trees on the Subject 
Property. R. 1743:94-95. Ward had submitted cabin plans for Mrs. Barton's review 
several days earlier, but Brighton had not yet responded. Ward had been told that Mrs. 
Barton was out of town and that the plans were under review by an architect. R. 1743:94. 
Nevertheless, Ward had hired Doug's Tree Service and, without even notifying Brighton, 
had begun cutting down trees and preparing to build without authorization. Id. at 95, 
112-13. 
Faced with Ward's unauthorized activity, Brighton had no choice but to file suit 
and seek a preliminary injunction. Id. The district court held a hearing on Brighton's 
motion for preliminary injunction on September 6 and 7, 1994. The court found that 
Ward's proposed cabin actually had four floors, in violation of the two floor limit in the 
Special Warranty Deed. October 1994 Order, Addendum Exh. B at 6, f 13a. Although 
the plans ostensibly included a basement and attic for storage purposes only, Ward's 
architect admitted that Ward instructed him to design the basement to include a garage 
door and to design the attic as a loft, but not to show it on the plans. R. 1743:196, 199-
200. Thus, the plans showed an "attic" with a loft overlook and flooring plan strong 
enough for "live loads," both of which are contrary to normal practice. R. 1743:129. 
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Indeed, Ward's architect admitted he had never seen an attic designed with a loft 
overlook. R. 1743:196-97. There were also spaces for dormer windows, though no 
windows were actually shown on the plans. R. 1743:198. Similarly, the basement 
conceptual drawings showed a blank concrete wall, while the detailed plans indicated 
there was instead a large gap, which would accommodate a garage door. R. 1743:132-35. 
The plans also showed the basement was equipped with heating vents and a possible 
fireplace. Id. at 137. 
Isabel Coats did not attend the injunction hearing and did not submit an affidavit. 
However, Mary Barton and the other three Moreton siblings all attended the hearing and 
testified, either in person or by affidavit. Each of the siblings testified that the restrictions 
were intended to protect the Family Cabin on the parcel that remained in Brighton 
Corporation, and that they had intended that only a small cabin be built on the Subject 
Property. Affidavits of Edward B. Moreton, Sarah M. Kunz, Frederick A. Moreton, Jr. 
and Paul T. Kunz, respectively (R. 109-28). 
After hearing the evidence, the district court ruled that Brighton did not act 
unreasonably in rejecting the plans. The order of preliminary injunction included the 
following findings, among others: ' ' 
The purposes of the foregoing covenants are, among other things, to 
preserve the private nature of plaintiff s cabin and the rustic nature of the 
surrounding lands, including the Subject Property, to limit the intrusion of 
high traffic and/or high activity level developments into plaintiffs property * 
from the Subject Property, and to preserve the natural view from plaintiffs 
cabin. 
* * * 
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[Ward's] plans were intentionally ambiguous as to the type of structure 
actually being proposed, and as to its placement on the Subject Property. 
5fc * * 
Brighton Corporation did not abuse its discretion in disapproving the 
Plans. 
* * * 
[T]he "two floor" restriction was included with the intent that the "two 
floors" be similar to the original cabin on the property now owned by 
Brighton Corporation where the first floor was built into grade with the 
front door on the west side on grade. 
October 1994 Order, Addendum Exh. B, at 5-7, fj[ 8,13b, 13d, 14. The court then 
enjoined Ward 
from undertaking construction of any improvements on the Subject 
Property without the express approval of plaintiff Brighton Corporation. In 
the event that defendants submit new and different proposed plans to 
plaintiff, which plans are then disapproved, defendants may apply to this 
Court for a determination of whether approval has been unreasonably 
withheld. 
Id. at 8 H 20. 
This order, including its findings, has not been appealed. 
5. Second Evidentiary Hearing - July 13, 1995. 
Subsequent to the original hearing and the issuance of the preliminary injunction, 
Mr. Ward submitted numerous sets of plans to Brighton Corporation. However, rather 
than submit plans for a "small cabin," "built into grade with the front door on the west 
side on grade," Ward submitted plans with slight modifications, but no significant 
changes that would result in compliance. R. 337-39. For example, he did not move the 
front door to either the west side (opening on grade on the lower floor), or the east side 
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(opening on the upper floor), as the original cabin was designed. Instead, Ward 
continued to submit plans with the front door on the north side opening on the lower 
floor. R. 345-49. Because of the slope of the hillside (from east to west), this placed the 
lower floor above grade on the west, suggesting the possibility of a hidden basement. 
R. 371-72. More importantly, it raised the height of the structure to at least 31 feet. 
R. 1753:53-54; 372. Brighton also objected that the placement of the main entrance and 
porch on the north side encroached on Brighton's waterline easement, which crossed the 
Subject Property just to the north of the proposed cabin, and to a proposed large cement 
patio on the south, which again increased the overall size of the improvement and could 
only be constructed by making an excessive cut in the mountainside. R. 372-73. 
Brighton refused to approve such plans, while at the same time suggesting an acceptable 
design: , 
Second, and perhaps most importantly, I want to reassure you that Brighton 
Corporation is prepared to review promptly and, if appropriate, approve "new 
and different" plans submitted to it. The plans submitted in March 1995 were 
not different. While your client chooses to belittle the Dransfield cabin < 
design,3 the court understood the original intention of the parties, when he 
wrote in his order: "The two floor restriction was included with the intent that 
the two floors be similar to the original cabin on the property now owned by 
Brighton Corporation where the first floor was built into grade with the front 
door on the west side on grade." Such a concept is simple and Brighton { 
Corporation will review such plans promptly. 
(R. 392-93.) 
The Dransfield cabin design had been proposed by Brighton as an acceptable alternative 
during the initial hearing. A copy of a photograph of the Dransfield cabin (September 
6, 1994 hearing, Exhs. 13-P and 14-P) is included in the Appendix as Exhibit M. 
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On July 13, 1995, the district court held another hearing to determine whether 
Brighton had unreasonably withheld its approval of Ward's plans. In addition to the 
issues stated above, the plans were not clear on the overlook to the second floor, which 
Ward's architect had testified was common with lofts, but which he had never seen in 
connection with an attic. R. 1753:53. Brighton's architect also testified that the elevation 
drawings were in conflict with the topography map by as much as five feet. R. 1753:57-
58. The district court held that Brighton's rejection was not unreasonable. 
6. Ward's Motion to Recuse Judge Young is Denied by Judge Lewis. 
On May 16, 1997, Ward moved to recuse Judge David Young as the district court 
judge assigned to the case on grounds that James S. Jardine, one of Brighton's attorneys, 
had signed an advertisement supporting Judge Young in his 1996 retention election 
campaign. R. 656-57. Ward argued that Jardine's signature on the advertisement created 
an "appearance" of "possible" partiality, but admitted there was no evidence of actual 
bias. Id. The election in question was held on November 6, 1996, over two years after 
the preliminary injunction was issued and more than one year after Judge Young denied 
Ward's request for a ruling that Brighton had unreasonably withheld its consent to a 
further set of plans. R. 681-82. Judge Young referred the motion to Judge Lewis, the 
presiding judge of the Third District Court, who denied it because the affidavit stated 
only a "concern about possible impartiality [sic]" and because the motion was untimely. 
Court's Ruling dated June 9, 1997, R. 718-21, Addendum Exh. D. 
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7. Brighton Obtains Partial Summary Judgment. 
On December 22, 1998, more than four years after the issuance of the injunction, 
Brighton filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking the following relief: (1) a 
ruling that it was reasonable for Brighton to charge Ward, on a going forward basis, for 
costs including professional fees incurred in connection with reviewing Ward's plans; (2) 
a ruling that it was reasonable for Brighton to require as a condition of approval that 
Ward's plans be signed by a licensed architect; and (3) a ruling that it was reasonable to 
consider the substantive provisions of the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone ordinance 
("FCOZ") in reviewing Ward's plans. Brighton sought the rulings "to avoid 
determination of these issues in the much more costly setting of a trial." R. 805-06. 
(a) Brighton's Justification for Cost Reimbursement. 
By the time of the motion, Brighton had reviewed several sets of plans, some with < 
multiple variations. However, Ward never submitted plans that followed the court's 
original finding (not challenged on appeal) that "[t]he two floor restriction was included 
with the intent that the two floors be similar to the original cabin on the property now 
owned by Brighton Corporation where the first floor was built into grade with the front 
door on the west side on grade." R. 824-25. Brighton incurred significant costs (over ' 
$60,000 in legal costs by the time of the motion) in reviewing such plans and defending 
its decisions in court. Brighton also had retained an architect to assist in reviewing the 
plans and, where appropriate, to provide expert testimony. R. 806-08, 967. 
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(b) The Basis for Requiring an Architect's Approval of the Plans. 
In addition to the initial finding of intentional ambiguity, the court rejected Ward's 
plans at the second hearing in part because of ambiguity. R. 807,1753:70. Neil 
Richardson, Brighton's architect, testified in both hearings that the plans were 
ambiguous. For example, in the second hearing, Richardson testified that the elevation 
drawings contradicted the topographical map by as much as five feet. R. 1753:57-58. 
The plans also consistently used the term "construction grade," a term that was not 
typically used in plans, and had never been defined by Ward. Despite Brighton's 
objections, it was never removed. R. 807. 
Moreover, Brighton and Ward had exchanged numerous letters regarding various 
plans Ward submitted, and ambiguity was a consistent complaint. Brighton objected to 
such terms as "plus or minus 1 foot using usual and customary construction practices" 
(December 31,1996), "actual location to be determined" (December 29, 1997), 
"assuming use of alternate support detail," "unless the appropriate building officials 
require otherwise," and "elevations subject to materials and methods used." Letter from 
James S. Jardine to David M. Connors dated June 10, 1998 (R. 866-68). Brighton had 
first raised the issue of architect approval nearly a year before filing the motion for partial 
summary judgment, in the belief that an architect could draw plans without the need for 
such ambiguous notations. Id. 
(c) Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone ordinance. 
The Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone ordinance ("FCOZ") of Salt Lake 
County encompasses the Brighton area. FCOZ provides a uniform set of guidelines 
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designed to "[p]reserve the visual and aesthetic qualities of the foothills and canyons" 
and to "[ejncourage development that fits the natural slope of the land in order to 
minimize the scarring and erosion effects of cutting, filling, and grading related to 
construction on hillsides, ridgelines and steep slopes." Salt Lake County Ordinances 
§ 19.72.010 (R. 870). Nevertheless, the County zoning division did not apply FCOZ to 
the Ward plans because it was not effective at the time Ward initially received zoning 
approval in 1994. 
(d) The Order of Partial Summary Judgment. 
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was granted, but with a significant 
modification to the application of FCOZ. The order read as follows, in pertinent part: 
In reviewing plans submitted by Mr. Ward, it is reasonable for 
Brighton Corporation to apply the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone 
ordinance ("FCOZ") of Salt Lake County to Ward's proposed plans for 
comparison. However, to the extent FCOZ contains a one-acre minimum 
lot size, the parties have stipulated that the provision shall not apply. At 
trial, Mr. Ward may challenge the reasonableness of specific provisions of 
FCOZ applied by Brighton in reviewing the plans. 
Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated March 3, 1999, Addendum 
Exh. E (R. 1185-88) (emphasis added). 
8. The Parties Stipulate to a Settlement. 
The parties stipulated to a settlement on March 3, 1999, the date originally 
scheduled for trial. Transcript of Hearing, March 3, 1999 (Exh. 1-P) ("Trans."), 
Addendum Exh. F, at 3. Several months prior to trial, Brighton's attorney made an offer 
to settle in a letter dated October 28, 1998. Id.; Letter from James S. Jardine to Brent D. 
Ward [counsel for Ward at that time] dated October 28, 1998 (Exh. 2-P) (Addendum 
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Exh. J) at 7 ("We hope this proposal will result in a resolution."). Ward did not directly 
respond to that proposal, instead submitting further plans for Brighton's review. On 
February 22, 1999, Brighton rejected Ward's then most recent plans for detailed reasons 
stated by letter. Letter from James S. Jardine to Douglas J. Parry [counsel for Ward at 
that time and through trial] dated February 22, 1999 (Exh. 3-P) (Addendum Exh. K). 
Ward accepted Brighton's settlement offer by letter dated February 25, 1999, 
accepting its terms with a few modifications: "I do believe that Mr. Ward is willing and 
has given his agreement that he accepts the conditions in your February 22, 1999 and 
your October 28,1998 letters as I have explained above." Letter from Douglas J. Parry 
to James S. Jardine dated February 25, 1999, R. 1252-54, at 3; see also Letter from James 
S. Jardine to Douglas J. Parry dated March 2,1999, R. 1256-58, at 1 ("I understand from 
your letter that Mr. Ward accepts the terms of our letters of October 28, 1998 and 
February 22, 1999."). After a meeting late in the day of March 2, 1999 between the 
parties' attorneys and architects and further phone calls that night and the following 
morning, the parties agreed on specific terms of settlement. Id; see also Trans., 
Addendum Exh. F, at 3. 
Accordingly, on March 3, 1999, the day originally scheduled for trial, the parties 
stipulated on the record to the terms of a settlement agreement: 
THE COURT: I've been informed informally that there's a 
stipulated resolution of this case, is that correct? 
MR. PARRY: If it can be stated correctly, yes. 
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Trans., Addendum Exh. F, at 3. In stating the terms of the agreement, Mr. Jardine 
identified the October 28, 1998 letter, the February 22, 1999 letter, and two checklists 
provided by Brighton's architect, and explained that Ward had agreed to the terms stated 
in those documents, with the exception of three requirements stated in the checklists. Id. 
at 4-5. Those letters specified changes to the "Chalet plans of June 3, 1998" and stated 
that "based on those plans," Brighton would give its approval "only if the following 
changes [are] made or conditions [are] met." October 28 letter, Addendum Exh. J, at 2. 
Mr. Jardine also described the process by which Ward was to submit compliant plans and 
Brighton was to review them. Trans., Addendum Exh. F, at 16-21. Mr. Parry also made 
comments, as did the district court. Id. 
This dialogue established that the plans were all to be submitted within 30 days, 
and were to be submitted seriatim as each sheet was prepared. Id. at 17, 21. Once the 
plans were submitted, under the terms of the agreement, Brighton had no less than 
fourteen days to review them and respond to Ward. Id. If the plans complied with the 
specific terms of the agreement, including the Richardson checklists, Brighton agreed to 
approve the plans. Id. at 6. Ward agreed to withdraw all plans filed with Salt Lake 
County and to file with the County only those plans which had the approval of Brighton 
and the Court. Id. 
In addition to terms stated in the letters and checklists, the parties agreed to 
conform the legal description of the roadway easement to reflect its actual location. 
Ward would have a surveyor update the survey and Brighton would bear the cost of 
having the new deed prepared. Id. at 10. 
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Brighton agreed not to add additional utilities within its 18-foot waterline 
easement across Ward's property and further agreed to provide Ward with reasonable 
notice of its need to repair and maintain the waterline. Id. at 10-11. The settlement 
agreement also contemplated that Ward could locate his utilities within that same 18-foot 
easement, if necessary, subject to certain specific limitations. Id. at 12. 
The settlement agreement allowed Brighton to pave, at its own expense, the 
section of its access road that crossed Ward's property. Id. at 15. Ward also agreed to 
apply for a permitted use permit, rather than a conditional use permit. Id. at 16. 
The terms of the October 28, 1998 letter and the description in the February 22, 
1999 letter of certain deficiencies (which deficiencies Ward agreed to remedy) were 
precise. They proposed specific changes to the "Chalet Plans of June 3,1998." 
(a) Front Porch on North. The October 28,1998 letter states that plans for the 
north porch must be more detailed. Addendum Exh. J at 2. The February 22,1999 letter 
states that the north porch plan is inadequate because it lacks "contour lines and exact 
elevations" and "a drawing showing how the porch and entry way fit into existing grade." 
Addendum Exh. K at 2. That letter also states that the drawing must be similar to "the 
original plans considered by the Court in September 1994." Id. Kimble Shaw, Ward's 
architect, admitted that he discussed this issue in a June 9, 1999 meeting with Scott 
Hagen, one of Brighton's attorneys, and that he was aware of exactly the type of drawing 
Brighton expected. R. 1751:402-04. 
(b) Waterline and Easement. The October 28,1998 letter makes clear that 
Brighton's waterline and easement must appear on Ward's plans in the location identified 
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by Brighton's surveyor, and all language questioning its validity must be removed. 
Addendum Exh. J at 2-3. 
(c) Ward's Sewer Line. The October 28, 1998 letter specifies the placement of 
Ward's sewer line. Addendum Exh. J at 3. 
(d) Patio. The October 28, 1998 letter specifies the size of the patio. 
Addendum Exh. J at 3-4. It was superseded on this issue by the February 22, 1999 letter. 
Trans., Addendum Exh. F, at 5. The February 22, 1999 letter points out that any 
"retaining wall of more than six feet would violate [FCOZ]." Addendum Exh. K at 2. 
The letter provides two options: (1) either the patio's size must be reduced (to a specified 
size), or (2) it must be stepped down. Addendum Exh. K at 3. 
(e) Parking. The October 28, 1998 letter states that parking "must be on or 
west of the circular driveway." Addendum. Exh. J at 4. 1 
(f) Exterior Elevation Drawings. The October 28, 1998 letter requires a set of 
drawings of the "front, rear, and both sides" of the proposed cabin showing how it will fit 
in with existing topography. Addendum Exh. J at 4. The letter explains the type of 
drawing required by reference to earlier drawings. Id. The letter specifies that the "upper 
surface of the first floor" must be at 116' 10". Id. The letter also specifies an acceptable { 
maximum height of the first floor ceilings. Id. 
(g) Topography Map and Survey. The October 28, 1998 letter specifies the 
topography map to be used, requires additional use of a specific transparent overlay, and 
lists the items to be shown thereon. Addendum Exh. J at 5. 
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(h) Roadway. The October 28, 1998 letter requires that the road's legal 
description (which was erroneous) must be corrected to match its physical location, and 
Brighton be authorized to pave the road. Addendum Exh. J at 5. 
(i) Additional Items. The October 28, 1998 letter then lists a number of minor 
requirements, each of which is clearly stated. Addendum Exh. J at 5-6. 
The October 28,1998 letter concludes that "all drawings and documents requested 
must be furnished" and each correction must be made. Addendum Exh. J at 6. Brighton's 
architect will then review such drawings for "accuracy," after which the agreement will be 
documented and Ward could obtain regulatory approvals and build. Addendum Exh. J at 
6-7. 
After the stipulation had been stated by counsel for the parties, the clerk placed 
both parties under oath, and the court then asked them whether the stated terms were true 
and correct and whether they agreed to and would implement those terms: 
THE COURT: All right. You've heard the statement of the 
stipulation by your attorney and also by Mr. Parry. Do you 
agree to the terms and conditions of this stipulation and agree 
to implement them? 
MRS. BARTON [on behalf of Brighton]: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Likewise, you've heard the 
statement of the stipulation now concurred and [sic] by all, 
including Brighton Corporation. Do you agree to the terms 
and conditions of the stipulation and to implement them, Mr. 
Ward? 
MR. WARD: Yes, yes. 
Trans., Addendum Exh. F, at 24. 
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The nature of the settlement was such that it replaced Brighton's discretionary 
right of review, which could only be reversed on a showing of an abuse of discretion, 
with an objective list of specific requirements. It also specified a process by which plans 
were to be reviewed. The agreement was "conditional," however, because "certain 
actions remain[ed] to be taken." Trans., Addendum Exh. F, at 3. That is, if Ward failed 
to present plans that complied with the settlement agreement, or Brighton failed to 
approve plans that complied, the parties would return to the court for a trial as to whether 
there was compliance with the objective terms of the agreement. Trans., Addendum Exh. 
F, at 17. Thus, the settlement agreement recognized that litigation might continue if one 
party did not comply therewith. Nevertheless, by the settlement agreement the 
substantive requirements and the process of review were now changed. 
9. Brighton Rejects the Plans Because they do not Comply with the Settlement. 
Ward submitted plans (all at once rather than seriatim, as had been agreed) in 
April 1999 ("April 1999 Plans"). R. 1750:59. Brighton's architect reviewed the plans 
and returned them with deficiencies noted on the plans and in a separate letter. 
R. 1750:59-60. Ward then submitted additional plans in June ("June 1999 Plans"), which 
Brighton disapproved by letter dated June 23, 1999, because the plans submitted by Ward 
did not correct the problems noted by Brighton's architect and because the plans did not 
comply with the settlement agreement. R. 1750:71-72. In response, Ward's attorney 
wrote a letter repudiating the settlement and declaring that he had been instructed to 
prepare for trial "on the 'unreasonableness' of Mary Barton's actions and objections." 
Letter from Douglas J. Parry to James S. Jardine dated July 7, 1999, Exh. 35-D. 
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10. Brighton Seeks to Pave Right-of-Way for Safety Reasons. 
Brighton had advised Ward earlier in the summer of 1999 of its intent to pave the 
private roadway that led from the main access road across the Subject Property to the 
main cabin and another cabin further up the mountainside. R. 1281. The road had been 
in use for years, but only during the summer, and only for access to the Family Cabin. 
However, by 1999, the Family Cabin and the additional cabin further up the road were in 
use year-round. Id. The roadway was simply a dirt road covered with gravel. It was 
difficult to keep it clear during the winter and required additional roadbase and gravel on 
a regular basis because of erosion. It was also a specific term of the agreement that 
Brighton could pave the roadway at its own expense "for safety and emergency vehicle 
access." October 28, 1998 letter, Addendum Exh. J, at 5. 
On September 3, 1999, after it became clear that Ward repudiated the settlement 
agreement and after Brighton's attempt to resolve the issue without court intervention 
was rejected, Brighton filed a motion to enforce the settlement and pave the roadway. 
R. 1197-98. The motion was served by mail on Ward's counsel on the same day. 
R. 1199. During a pretrial conference held on September 8, 1999, Brighton's counsel 
advised the district court of the filing of the motion and asked to set a hearing date as 
early as possible to allow for time to pave the road before the onset of winter weather. 
Ward's counsel objected to an early hearing date, claiming he needed to prepare for an 
upcoming trial (in which opposing counsel, coincidentally, was the same attorney 
representing Brighton in this case). Response to Gregory M. Ward's Petition for 
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Extraordinary Writ Directed to Judge David S. Young, Third District Court, State of Utah 
(Addendum Exh. L) at 7. 
By the time of the September 8, 1999 pretrial conference, this case had been 
pending for five years. The district court had held two evidentiary hearings, decided a 
motion for partial summary judgment, and, at the request of both parties (and in their i 
presence), actually visited the property. Id. at 9. The court had also been present during 
the March 3, 1999 hearing when the parties stipulated to the settlement on the record. Id. 
After Ward's counsel objected to an early hearing date, the court asked him to 
state Ward's objections to the paving. Ward's counsel argued that paving the road would 
damage the environment and degrade the Subject Property. Brighton's counsel 
responded that paving was appropriate for safety reasons and that it was authorized in the 
settlement agreement. After hearing these arguments, the court authorized Brighton < 
Corporation to pave the road. Id. at 8. 
On September 14, 1999, six days after the pretrial conference, Ward filed an 
objection to Brighton's proposed order allowing paving of the roadway. The objection, 
though ostensibly an objection to the form of order, addressed the merits of the district 
court's decision. R. 1284-91. Furthermore, on September 16, 1999, two days later, Ward < 
filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to enforce the settlement agreement. 
R. 1315-28. On September 17, 1999, Brighton filed a response to Ward's objection, and 
on September 20, 1999, Brighton filed a notice to submit regarding the proposed order. 
R. 13 83-91. On September 21, 1999, the district court considered and overruled Ward's 
objections and signed the order authorizing Brighton to pave the road. R. 1392-94. The 
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road was not paved until after the court issued its written order. Addendum Exh. L at 10. 
The court subsequently granted Brighton's motion to enforce the settlement agreement. 
11. Ward Submits Additional Plans Shortly Before Trial. 
During the September 3, 1999 pretrial conference, the court set a trial date of 
November 17-18,1999 and the parties began to prepare for trial. R. 1282-83. Shortly 
before trial, on November 1, 1999, Ward's attorneys advised Brighton's attorneys for the 
first time that Ward would seek at trial to litigate a new set of plans that had been 
submitted for review in October 1999, not the June 1999 Plans submitted pursuant to the 
settlement agreement and for which the trial date had been set. Letter from James K. 
Tracy [counsel for Ward at that time and currently] to James S. Jardine dated Nov. 1, 
1999, Exh. 39-D. Brighton asserted three reasons for refusing to review the October 
1999 Plans. 
First, the October 1999 Plans were not submitted pursuant to the settlement 
agreement and violated a specific provision thereof. Letter from Scott A. Hagen to James 
K. Tracy dated Nov. 10,1999, Exh. 40-D. The settlement agreement specified a 
particular placement on the Subject Property and a first floor elevation of 116' 10", while 
the October 1999 Plans depicted a rotated placement and a first floor elevation of 119 
feet. Id. Second, Ward had refused to pay Brighton's attorney fees incurred in reviewing 
the April 1999 Plans and June 1999 Plans. Id. Third, in July 1999, when Ward 
disavowed the settlement and declared his intent to litigate, he had not yet submitted the 
October 1999 Plans. R. 1451. Brighton had prepared for trial on the issue of "Mary 
Barton's actions and objections" regarding the April 1999 Plans and June 1999 Plans. Id. 
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12. Ward's Second Expert Disallowed Because He Could Not Testify Regarding 
Compliance with Settlement Agreement. 
During the trial, Ward sought to call as an expert witness Carl Eriksson, a former 
employee of the Salt Lake County Development Services Division, to testify regarding 
the clarity of Ward's plans and their compliance with FCOZ. R. 1750:216. However, 
Eriksson admitted in voir dire that he had not read the transcript, letters and checklists 
that made up the settlement agreement. R. 1750:223-25. Eriksson also admitted that the 
retaining wall around the south patio was more than six feet high. R. 1750:228. The 
district court sustained Brighton's objection to Eriksson's testimony, on grounds that the 
issue was compliance with the settlement agreement and Eriksson, being unfamiliar with 
the agreement, would not be able to give helpful expert testimony. R. 1750:227, 229. 
Ward subsequently submitted a written proffer of Eriksson's testimony in 
connection with a motion to reconsider. The proffer stated Eriksson would testify on 15 
issues, three of which are arguably relevant to appellate issues raised by Ward. Ward 
proffered that Eriksson would testify, among other things, (1) that the April 1999 Plans 
and the June 1999 Plans were, together, final plans; (2) that the plans complied with 
FCOZ ("the intent of FCOZ has been met"); and (3) that the plans had been approved by 
Salt Lake County. R. 1540-43. 
After hearing oral argument, the court denied Ward's motion to reconsider, stating 
that Eriksson's testimony would not be helpful. R. 1751:271. 
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13. The Court Rules that the April 1999 Plans and June 1999 Plans do not 
Comply with the Agreement. 
Kimble Shaw, Ward's architect, testified at trial that neither the April 1999 Plans 
nor the June 1999 Plans were final plans. R. 1751:351. In fact, Shaw testified that he 
was in the process of correcting problems identified on the April 1999 Plans when Ward 
instructed him to stop working because Brighton was allegedly unwilling to settle. 
R. 1751:417-19. Both Shaw and Ward admitted that Brighton was never told that the 
June 1999 Plans, which Brighton spent time and incurred professional fees to review, 
were not submitted as final plans. R. 1751:422. 
Shaw also testified that he finished the drawings, but only later, after the parties 
were preparing for trial. R. 1751:366. The completed drawings were submitted in 
October 1999 and featured a rotated cabin placement and raised elevation of the first 
floor. Shaw admitted that the June 1999 Plans did not include an updated survey, the 
sewer line was drawn in conflict with the settlement agreement, and the south patio could 
only be built with retaining walls in excess of six feet high. R. 1751:384, 405, 407. 
Shaw conceded that he did not include a conceptual drawing of the north main entrance. 
Id. at 402. Shaw also admitted that the elevations on the June 1999 Plans submitted were 
only "called out" or proposed elevations, not "spot elevations," as would be provided by 
a surveyor. Id. at 414-15. 
Ward testified that he told Shaw to do everything Brighton requested for 
compliance with the settlement agreement. R. 1751:464. But he admitted telling Shaw 
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not to obtain an updated survey or step down the patio, both of which were required by 
the settlement agreement. Id. at 508-09. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Settlement Agreement was Binding and Enforceable. The parties 
stipulated to a settlement agreement in open court. The agreement consists of two letters, 
two checklists, and the transcript of the stipulation. At the conclusion of the stipulation, 
the parties were sworn and then separately stated that they agreed to and would 
implement the terms of the agreement. Ward's argument - that the parties agreed to 
nothing and could simply walk away - is inconsistent with the record as a whole and with 
the parties' oaths. Moreover, the parties agreed to every necessary provision; only future 
compliance was left undone. The agreement was detailed and specific, certainly clear 
enough to be enforceable. Finally, Utah law is clear that an agreement is enforceable 
even if it is contemplated that a further writing will be prepared. 
2. The District Court Correctly Allowed Brighton to Pave the Roadway. 
Brighton had the right under the settlement agreement to pave the private roadway, as 
stated on the record and in the October 28, 1998 letter. Brighton never stated in the 
August 1999 letter that it could pave only with Ward's consent. Rather, the letter ( 
explicitly states Brighton's position that the settlement is binding and Brighton has the 
right to pave. Moreover, Ward was not deprived due process because he was able to 
respond to Brighton's motion orally and file an objection and memorandum in opposition 
before the order was signed. Even if he was deprived of due process, he suffered no 
prejudice thereby. 
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3. The Partial Summary Judgment was Correct. Brighton's partial summary 
judgment motion sought guidance for reviews it wanted to conduct before trial. The 
partial summary judgment order was partially mooted by the subsequent settlement. The 
issue was whether Brighton's modest proposals were "reasonable" given the undisputed 
facts. Further, it was reasonable for Brighton to require that Ward reimburse it for costs 
of review because Brighton was incurring extraordinary costs and Ward had submitted 
ambiguous plans. It was reasonable to require an architect's signature to prevent 
ambiguity. It was reasonable to consider the FCOZ development standards because they 
were intended to protect interests similar to those in the Special Warranty Deed. 
4. The October 1999 Plans were Properly not Considered at Trial. The October 
1999 Plans were properly not considered at trial because they did not even purport to 
comply. The agreement specified the cabin's position on the property and set the main 
floor elevation at 116.83 feet while the October 1999 Plans rotated the cabin and set the 
main floor elevation at 119 feet. Second, Ward repudiated the agreement and declared 
his intention to litigate three months before the October 1999 Plans were even submitted, 
and first notified Brighton of its intent to litigate the October 1999 Plans on November 1, 
1999, less than three weeks before trial. Third, Ward refused to reimburse Brighton for 
its costs of reviewing plans. 
5. The April 1999 Plans and June 1999 Plans did not Comply. The court 
correctly held at trial that the plans submitted by Ward contradicted or breached the 
agreement in several respects. First, the plans were not final, as Ward's architect 
admitted and the court specifically found. Second, the site plan characterized the existing 
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waterline easement as new, in violation of a specific term of the agreement. Third, the 
sewer line was placed incorrectly. Fourth, the retaining wall behind the south patio was 
more than six feet high. Fifth, no updated Francom survey was delivered with the plans. 
Sixth, Ward failed to submit a color board and a transparency of the Sneidman survey. 
Seventh, corrected support documents were not submitted. Eighth, Ward failed to submit 
exterior elevation drawings showing the relationship of the cabin to the slope of the 
mountain, including conceptual drawings of the north porch as required by the 
agreement. 
6. Carl Eriksson's Testimony was Properly Excluded. Ward offered the 
i 
testimony of two experts, Kimble Shaw, his architect, and Carl Eriksson, a former 
employee of Salt Lake County. Eriksson was prepared to testify that Ward's plans were 
final, that they complied with the "intent" of FCOZ, and that they had been approved by < 
Salt Lake County. However, Eriksson was not familiar with the settlement agreement, 
which had incorporated a specific requirement of FCOZ that even Eriksson admitted the 
plans failed. Additionally, Kimble Shaw, who drafted the plans, testified they were not 
final. Finally, county approval of the plans was not at issue. 
7. Brighton's Rejection of Ward's Plans was Properly Vindicated at the July 13, ( 
1995 Hearing. At the original 1994 hearing, the court gave an interpretation of the 
Special Warranty Deed which has not been appealed. In particular, the court found that 
the parties intended that only a small cabin be placed on the Subject Property, with the 
entrance opening on the west (downhill) side on grade. The plans reviewed at the 
July 13, 1995 hearing reflected a large cabin (31 feet high) with its entrance halfway up 
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the hill on the north. Moreover, the plans were ambiguous, with a discrepancy between 
the elevation drawings and topographical map of as much as five feet. Accordingly, 
Brighton was not unreasonable in rejecting those plans. 
8. Judge Leslie Lewis Properly Refused to Recuse Judge Young. Ward sought 
to recuse Judge Young in April 1997 because one of Brighton's attorneys had signed an 
advertisement in Judge Young's support during his 1996 retention election. It is well-
settled that such actions do not warrant recusal of a judge because of the public policy 
encouraging lawyer participation in judicial elections. There was no showing of bias. 
Furthermore, Judge Young should not be disqualified by this Court. He has heard 
the evidence presented by both sides and his decisions have been correct. At the initial 
hearing, Judge Young found that Ward submitted "intentionally ambiguous" plans, a 
finding Ward does not challenge. Since then, Judge Young has held two additional 
evidentiary hearings, visited the property, and decided numerous motions. Brighton 
would be prejudiced if Judge Young were replaced by a judge lacking experience (in this 
case) with Ward's deceptiveness in preparing and submitting plans. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Ward's appeal is yet another attempt to obtain from the judiciary what he has not 
been able to wring from Brighton - permission to build a structure that is at odds with the 
restrictive covenants burdening his land or a subsequent settlement agreement. Brighton 
filed this case because Ward began cutting down mature trees in a mountain setting to 
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build according to plans never approved by Brighton. In the initial order of preliminary 
injunction - which Ward does not challenge - the court found that those plans were 
"intentionally ambiguous" and provided for four floors, not two, as allowed by the 
restrictive covenants. The court further found that the intent of the restrictions was that 
only a small cabin be built on Ward's property with the first floor "built into grade with 
the front door on the west side on grade." While Brighton's discretionary review of 
Ward's plans has been informed by this authoritative interpretation, Ward has refused to 
comply. Even after the parties by agreement replaced the discretionary review with a list 
of objective requirements, Ward clearly failed to comply. Instead, he repudiated the 
i 
agreement and went back to court. 
Judge Young has held several evidentiary hearings, visited the property in 
question, and decided numerous motions. He has devoted time to this case and has i 
become familiar with it. Moreover, as demonstrated below, Judge Young's rulings have 
been correct. Ward has always had it within his power to submit compliant plans and 
build a cabin. That he has not done so is his own fault, and cannot be laid at the feet of 
Brighton Corporation or the district court. Brighton addresses Ward's arguments in the 
order presented in his brief. ( 
I. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS BINDING AND 
ENFORCEABLE - WARD SIMPLY FAILED TO COMPLY. 
"It is a basic rule that the law favors the settlement of disputes." Co. v. A&H 
Equip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Zions First Nat'l Bank v. 
Barbara Jensen Interiors, 781 P.2d 478, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Voluntary settlement 
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of legal disputes is favored by the law."). Settlement agreements are governed by the 
rules applicable to general contract actions. "Basic contract principles affect the 
determination of when a settlement agreement should be so enforced." John Deere, 876 
P.2d at 883 (quoting Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Sys., Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993)). Furthermore, the question of whether parties to a contract intend that it 
be binding is a question of fact. O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah 1981). As 
such, a district court determination regarding that factual issue is overturned only if it is 
clearly erroneous. 
In this case, the transcript shows that the parties intended to bind themselves to an 
agreement that replaced Brighton's right of discretionary review with a list of specific, 
objective requirements. The requirements were listed in the two letters, two checklists, 
and additional duties as stated in court. In addition to the objective list of requirements, 
the parties agreed that if Ward submitted compliant plans, Brighton would approve them, 
and they would be incorporated in an order setting forth the agreement. The parties 
demonstrated their intent to be bound by swearing under oath that they agreed to the 
terms and would implement them. Ward's failure to submit compliant plans prevented a 
full settlement with approved plans incorporated in a final order. Nevertheless, the 
remainder of the agreement remains in place and is binding. 
Ward's argument that the settlement agreement was not binding and enforceable is 
without merit. In essence, Ward argues that the parties never finished making their 
agreement, that they merely agreed to agree, and that Ward was free to walk away from 
what he claims were continuing negotiations. The facts simply do not justify such a 
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claim. Rather, this was a binding contract that was breached. Indeed, the agreement was 
a significant benefit to Ward. To receive approval, he needed only to comply with the 
specific, objective provisions of the agreement. If he did so, Brighton was required to 
approve the plans, and approved plans could then be included in a final court order. 
However, Ward failed to comply in obvious, objective ways, for which he has no one to 
blame but himself. Ward's specific arguments are refuted below. 
A. THE SETTLEMENT WAS NOT MERELY "AN AGREEMENT TO 
AGREE.'' 
Ward first makes the remarkable argument that this agreement was "an agreement 
to agree" that required a further manifestation of assent before it would become binding. ., 
Ward apparently claims he could simply walk away from the March 3, 1999 stipulation 
and its objective terms, and unilaterally return the parties to the discretionary review 
i 
procedure in place before the stipulation. That argument is untenable in light of the 
parties' statements during the March 3, 1999 hearing, and as a matter of common sense. 
The March 3, 1999 hearing began with Judge Young stating that he had "been ( 
informed informally that there's a stipulated resolution of this case, is that correct?" Mr. 
Parry, Ward's attorney, responded "If it can be stated correctly, yes."4 The attorneys for 
the parties then described the terms of the settlement, which was comprised of two letters 
(the October 28, 1998 letter and the February 22, 1999 letter) and two checklists, with 
modifications and additions as stated on the record in court. Trans. Addendum Exh. F. 
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The agreement was finalized when the clerk placed the parties under oath and the court 
asked each one separately, in the presence of counsel, to indicate whether they agreed: 
THE COURT: All right. You've heard the statement of the stipulation by 
your attorney and also by Mr. Parry. Do you agree to the terms and 
conditions of this stipulation and agree to implement them? 
MRS. BARTON [on behalf of Brighton]: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Likewise, you've heard the statement of the 
stipulation now concurred and [sic] by all, including Brighton Corporation. 
Do you agree to the terms and conditions of the stipulation and to 
implement them, Mr. Ward? 
MR. WARD: Yes, yes. 
Id. at 24. The parties agreed to the "terms and conditions of the stipulation" — not to 
keep negotiating. Thus, the agreement was "conditional," but only in that "further 
actions remain[ed] to be taken." Specifically, Ward was to submit plans and Brighton 
was to review them. If the plans complied with the specific terms of the settlement 
agreement, Brighton was to approve them. If Brighton rejected them, Ward could 
challenge the rejection, but the issue for trial would be compliance with the terms of the 
settlement agreement, not whether Brighton had acted reasonably and in good faith. 
These actions were to be taken pursuant to the settlement agreement, not to further 
negotiate it. Ward could have decided not to submit plans in compliance with the 
settlement (as he did). However, the consequence was not to void the settlement or 
preclude further submissions, but to bar Ward from building any cabin. Although the 
4
 Ward seizes on Brighton's counsel's use of the word, "proposed," in stating the 
settlement to the court. Ward argues that word signifies an agreement to agree. 
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court hoped that "the whole matter will be resolved upon this stipulation," Addendum 
Exh. F at 25 (emphasis added), Ward's duty to submit compliant plans (and if he 
performed, Brighton's duty to approve them) left open the possibility of continued 
litigation, though on new and different terms, i.e., the terms of the settlement agreement. 
In assessing the intent of the parties to form a binding contract, this Court must 
defer to the trial judge, who witnessed the interchange in court. O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d 
1289, 1291 (Utah 1981) (whether parties intend to enter binding contract is fact question 
to be resolved by trier of fact). This is particularly so in reviewing the meaning and 
effect of an oral stipulation, where the speakers may not use language as precisely as in a 
written document. See Kroupa v. Kroupa, 574 N.W.2d 208, 215 (S.D. 1998) (Sabers, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (suggesting that a district court's interpretation of a settlement 
stipulation in open court is "precisely the type of determination that normally receives a < 
deferential, abuse of discretion review"). Here, the trial court, having witnessed the 
stipulation, has determined that the parties intended to form a binding contract. Because 
there is clearly substantial evidence to support that determination, it must be upheld. 
Ward also argues that there was no contract because the trial date was merely 
postponed, not cancelled. However, as described above, the trial date was required in { 
case of breach, not the failure of negotiations. At trial, the court would not measure 
compliance with the discretionary standard of the Special Warranty Deed, but with the 
specific requirements of the settlement agreement (in the event plans were disapproved). 
However, it is obviously used as a prefatory word in trying "to state correctly" the 
settlement. 
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Thus, the mere fact that the trial date was not absolutely cancelled does not mean there 
was no contract. 
Finally, that the parties ultimately intended to state the agreement in a subsequent 
formal document if and when there were approved plans does not mean there was no 
agreement at all. An agreement is not unenforceable merely because the parties plan to 
prepare a formal contract at a later date. Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d 357, 
363 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
B. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE 
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER WARD'S PLANS WERE APPROVED. 
Ward also argues that the settlement agreement was merely conditional until 
Brighton actually approved plans. Brighton agrees with the trial court's statement that 
the "whole matter" could not be resolved and dismissed without Ward's submission of 
compliant plans and Brighton's approval thereof. In that sense, dismissal of the case was 
conditional. However, the parties did not indicate that Ward's failure to submit 
compliant plans would negate the agreement. Indeed, the language cited by Ward 
expressly contemplates that plans might not be approved: "final plans, if approved, 
[must] be included and incorporated into the court's final order." Letter from James S. 
Jardine to Douglas J. Parry dated March 2, 1999, R. 1258, cited in Appellant's Brief at 
48. It does not indicate that in such event, the parties would have agreed to nothing, as 
Ward claims. 
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C. THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT AMBIGUOUS, BUT WAS CLEAR ON 
ALL ESSENTIAL TERMS. 
Ward also argues, unconvincingly, that the settlement agreement was too 
ambiguous to be enforceable. A contract is only unenforceable because of ambiguity, 
however, if it is so indefinite it cannot be enforced. Plateau Mining v. Utah Div. of State 
Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 726 (Utah 1990). In this case, there is no ambiguity. 
Ward claims the settlement agreement is ambiguous because the October 28, 1998 
and the February 22, 1999 letters are insufficiently specific. Indeed, he claims there are 
50-70 requirements, depending on how the letters are read. However, the mere fact of 
numerous requirements does not indicate ambiguity, but demonstrates the extent of detail
 ( 
and clarity required by Brighton and agreed to by Ward. Moreover, Ward fails to give any 
persuasive example of ambiguity, and the letters are in general very detailed and specific. 
Most of the specific provisions are detailed in the statement of facts and it is unnecessary to 
repeat them. The specific "ambiguities" raised by Ward are refuted as follows:5 
1. South patio. There is no ambiguity regarding the application of FCOZ to the < 
south patio. The October 28, 1998 letter requires that the patio be reduced to a specific 
size. The February 22, 1999 letter specifically points out that a retaining wall in excess 
of six feet violates FCOZ. It offers two alternatives: either the patio's size must be 
reduced or it must be "stepped down." Addendum Exh. K at 2. The result is that under 
{ 
5
 Ward demonstrates the weakness of his argument by misquoting the March 2, 1999 
letter. While Brighton stated that "the February 22, 1999 letter does not set out terms of 
settlement but does list three areas of deficiency," it went on to state "thus, we assume 
that by "accepting" that letter, you mean that Mr. Ward agrees that those deficiencies 
will be corrected." (Def. Exh. 32.) 
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the settlement agreement Ward may comply by reducing the patio's size as specified or 
by stepping it down, using retaining walls that do not exceed six feet. There is no 
ambiguity. 
2. North porch. The October 28,1998 letter states that Brighton has not 
received the requested detailed drawings of the north porch and suggests that the entrance 
be moved to the west (at the level of the first floor) or the east (at the level of the second 
floor). The letter goes on to refer to specific drawings received in connection with 
previous plans: 
Drawings of the front, rear, and both sides of the chalet cabin showing 
the relationship of the cabin to the existing topography of the land must be 
submitted to Brighton Corporation. These drawings are to be the same type 
of drawings that have been submitted with other plans delivered to 
Brighton Corporation in December 1993, March 1994, July 1995 and 
August 1995." 
Addendum Exh. J at 4. The February 22, 1999 letter further clarifies that Brighton 
needs a drawing with "contour lines and exact elevations," and "a drawing 
showing how the porch and entryway fit into existing grade." The letter 
specifically explains that the "heavy black line" used to show existing grade is 
insufficient and reiterates that Brighton is requesting a drawing similar to those 
submitted in the past in connection with other plans: "the original plans 
considered by the Court in September 1994 showed how the cabin would fit into 
the existing landscape." Addendum Exh. K at 2. Thus, Brighton was merely 
asking for a drawing with "contour lines and exact elevations" and "a drawing 
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showing how the porch and entryway fit into existing grade," like specific 
drawings Ward had produced before. This is not ambiguous. 
3. Updated survey. The October 28, 1998 letter specified that Ward must 
submit the original Francom survey and a transparent copy of the Sneidman survey to use 
with the Francom survey. Addendum Exh. J at 5. The letter specified the information to 
be included. The checklist required that the survey show existing vegetation, which 
required that the existing survey be updated. Mr. Jardine stated in court, however, that 
the updated survey needed only to address the "areas of disturbance." Addendum Exh. F 
at 5. Again, this is not ambiguous. 
4. Elevation of first floor. The October 28, 1998 letter states that the cabin must 
be "built into the slope of the mountain with the upper surface of the first floor at 116' 
10", and with no basement." Addendum Exh. J at 4. There is no other language in that 
letter or the February 22, 1999 letter or the checklists or transcript that makes that 
ambiguous. 
5. Attorney fees. The settlement did not address the issue of legal fees and 
Brighton never requested them until Ward submitted his third set of plans after the 
settlement agreement. Whether the settlement agreement somehow makes it 
unreasonable for Brighton to ask for fees as a condition of further review is a matter of 
contract interpretation, not fatal ambiguity. 
6. 1999 building season. Mr. Parry stated during the hearing that Ward hoped 
to avoid missing the 1999 building season. Addendum Exh. F at 17-18. However, it was 
not stated as a condition, and there is no apparent basis for treating it as such. Because 
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the agreement created a process and set specific standards, there was no requirement that 
plans be approved or that building actually occur. Mr. Ward's authorization to build was 
contingent on his submitting compliant plans. His failure to do so did not void the 
agreement. 
Finally, the mere fact that an additional document was contemplated does not 
make the agreement unenforceable. Brown's Shoe Fit, 955 P.2d at 363. Ward was given 
an objective checklist which he did not meet. The remaining actions to be taken were 
steps of compliance, not matters for additional agreement. Moreover, the agreement was 
not so vague as to be unenforceable. Accordingly, the agreement is binding and 
enforceable. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION TO ALLOW PAVING OF THE 
ROADWAY WAS CORRECT. MOREOVER, WARD WAS GIVEN 
NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. 
A. BRIGHTON WAS ENTITLED TO PAVE THE ROAD. 
Because paving the road was a specific benefit to Brighton under the settlement 
agreement, Brighton was entitled to pave the road at any time after the agreement was 
made on March 3, 1999. Moreover, for the reasons stated above, the agreement was 
enforceable. 
Ward's references to in-court statements and an excerpt from a letter fail to 
demonstrate that the agreement was unenforceable on that or any other point. During the 
hearing, Mr. Jardine did state "It's our understanding that if this goes through, we would 
pave the road, at Brighton Corporation's expense." However, "this," that is, the 
settlement agreement, did "go through" later in the hearing when the parties swore that 
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they agreed to and would implement the terms of the settlement agreement. Taken in 
context, this is clearly what was intended. Further, the October 28, 1998 letter gave 
Brighton the right to pave without any alleged qualifying language. Addendum Exh. J at 
5. On this factual issue, the trial court's determination must be affirmed unless it was 
clearly erroneous. Smith v. Wilson, 579 P.2d 339 (Utah 1978) (contractual intent is an 
issue of fact). 
Furthermore, the August 5, 1999 letter, notwithstanding Ward's selective quote, 
supports Brighton's argument. The letter states as follows: 
Thank you for your letter of July 22, 1999. We disagree with most of 
your letter, particularly your assertion that there is no settlement agreement. 
However, we recognize with you that we will not be able to get a resolution 
of that issue in a time frame that would allow Brighton to pave the road this 
fall. We also recognize that the Property Use Agreement refers to the 
roadway easement as a "gravel" roadway. Accordingly, we agree that until 
the issue is resolved, as a practical matter, Brighton can pave the road this 
year only with your client's agreement. We therefore make the following 
proposal for your consideration. 
R. 1313. When Ward rejected Brighton's proposal, Brighton moved to enforce the 
agreement and pave the road. The letter expressly denies the assertion that there is no 
settlement agreement. 
B. WARD WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS. 
Ward was also not denied due process. This Court has made clear that 
Due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; it is flexible and requires such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands. In an analysis of 
a procedure an important factor is the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a 
private interest through the procedures, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards. 
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Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980). The circumstances of 
this case are unique. First, the district judge was intimately familiar with the parties and 
their dispute. He had held two evidentiary hearings, made a personal visit to the property 
in question (accompanied by the parties and their attorneys), and witnessed the parties5 
stipulated settlement in his courtroom. Part of the settlement was Brighton's express 
right to pave the roadway. 
Second, the parties had exchanged letters regarding paving the roadway. Ward 
and his attorney were familiar with Brighton's desire to pave the roadway, its reasons for 
doing so, and its position that it was authorized by the settlement agreement. 
Third, Brighton desired to pave the road for safety reasons. Specifically, the main 
cabin and an additional cabin up the roadway were now used in the winter and the fire 
department required that such roads be paved to assure access for emergency vehicles. 
For that reason, Brighton sought an early hearing date on the motion, which Ward's 
attorney opposed during the pretrial conference. 
Fourth, Ward was heard on the issue of the paving. After Mr. Parry, Ward's 
counsel, opposed Brighton's request for an early hearing, the district court asked him to 
explain why Ward opposed the paving. Mr. Parry stated that Ward believed paving the 
road would harm the environment and degrade his property value. The Court also heard 
from Brighton and then, having heard from both parties, authorized Brighton to pave the 
road. Furthermore, Ward also briefed the matter on the merits before the order was 
signed. On September 14, 1999, Ward filed an objection to the proposed court order that 
addressed the merits of the motion. In addition, Ward filed a memorandum in opposition 
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to the motion to enforce the settlement on September 16, 1999. The order was not signed 
until September 21, 1999, after the district court received both the objection and the 
memorandum in opposition. 
Under these circumstances, Ward was not denied procedural due process. The 
district court was very familiar with the issues, as was Mr. Parry, and by the time the 
order was signed, Mr. Parry had lodged both an objection and a memorandum in 
opposition. Thus, there was little risk that Ward was erroneously deprived of a property 
interest. Worrall, 616 P.2d at 602. This Court has affirmed in similar situations. 
Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 235 (Utah 1983)) (district court did not err in adopting 
findings before other side could object because court reviewed objections when they were 
filed and did not change findings). 
Even assuming that Ward was denied due process, he is not necessarily entitled to 
substantive relief, i.e., an order that the paving be removed. Ward must first show that he 
was prejudiced by the alleged deprivation. U.S. West Comm., Inc., v. Public Service 
Comm., 901 P.2d 270, 280 (Utah 1995) (declining to address claim of due process 
violation without showing of prejudice); Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644, 649 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (declining to address claim of due process violation without showing of 
prejudice). Ward's only substantive argument, however, is that the settlement agreement 
was unenforceable. As demonstrated above, however, since the agreement was 
enforceable Brighton had the right to pave the road, and Ward had no right to object. For 
these reasons, the district court committed no prejudicial error in granting the motion to 
pave the road. 
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III. BRIGHTON'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS 
PROPERLY GRANTED. 
This Court should reject Ward's claim that Brighton's partial summary judgment 
motion was improperly granted. First, this issue is at least partially moot because the 
settlement agreement superseded it on two of the three issues. Second, the motion was 
properly granted. Brighton had a discretionary right of review over Ward's plans, which 
it could not exercise unreasonably. The district court's ruling correctly held that certain 
contemplated acts of Brighton were not unreasonable under the circumstances. 
A. THE ISSUE OF THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS 
RENDERED PARTIALLY MOOT BY THE SUBSEQUENT 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
A settlement agreement renders moot previous rulings in a case that are resolved 
in the settlement agreement. Black v. Alpha Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 409,410 (Utah 1982). 
In this case, the order of partial summary judgment held (1) that it was reasonable for 
Brighton to require Ward, on a going forward basis, to reimburse Brighton for 
professional costs incurred in reviewing Ward's plans; (2) that it was reasonable for 
Brighton to require as a condition of review that Ward submit only plans that are 
complete and have been signed by a licensed architect; and (3) that it was reasonable for 
Brighton to apply the standards of FCOZ in reviewing Ward's plans (also allowing Ward 
to challenge the application of specific standards at trial). 
The settlement agreement specifically addressed two of these issues. First, the 
agreement required that Ward submit "final plans" that had been signed by an architect. 
Second, the agreement specified that unless the south patio was reduced to a specified 
size, it was to be "stepped down" the slope in compliance with FCOZ, and stated that a 
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retaining wall over six feet high violates FCOZ. The settlement agreement then recites a 
number of additional specific requirements without any reference to FCOZ. Compliance 
with the specific requirements entitled Ward to approval. The specific requirements 
replaced any FCOZ standards as a guide for Brighton's review. Because the agreement 
covers those two issues, Ward's appeal is moot as to the partial summary judgment 
regarding architect approval and FCOZ. 
Furthermore, even if the partial summary judgment is incorrect on the issue of cost 
reimbursement, it did not prejudice Ward. Ward has never reimbursed Brighton for any 
costs. Although Brighton raised Ward's nonpayment as one of three reasons for not 
reviewing Ward's October 1999 plans, Brighton refused to review those plans because 
the October 1999 plans rotated and raised the proposed structure, resulting in a main floor 
elevation of 119 feet, clearly higher than the 116.83 feet stated in the settlement i 
agreement. Thus, even if the partial summary judgment on the issue of cost 
reimbursement was incorrect, the error does not require that the judgment be reversed. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
At the time of the motion for partial summary judgment, Brighton had a 
discretionary right to review the plans based on language in the Special Warranty Deed 
stating that Brighton "expressly reserves the right to review and approve the proposed 
placement, plans, and design for any improvements to be located upon the above-
described property, which approval shall be timely and shall not be unreasonably 
withheld." Addendum Exh. A, Special Warranty Deed, at 2. It is well-settled that such 
language provides discretion, even in the absence of specific standards, subject to the 
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condition that the discretion must be exercised reasonably and in good faith. Rhue v. 
Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 449 P.2d 361, 362-63 (Colo. 1969) (citing cases); McNamee v. 
Bishop Trust Co., Ltd., 616 P.2d 205, 209 (Haw. 1980) (citing cases). This standard was 
applied by the district court at the first hearing, and was the basis for its ruling that 
Brighton did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the plans. That order has not been 
appealed and is therefore binding law of the case. 
The motion for partial summary judgment merely sought the district court's 
guidance for its plan review process, in advance of trial, on three issues. 11 Moore's 
Federal Practice, § 56.40[2] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) (partial summary judgment proper 
vehicle for narrowing trial issues). 
First, the court's ruling on FCOZ was not erroneous because it reserved ultimate 
judgment for trial and thus did not affect Ward's rights. The order states as follows: 
In reviewing plans submitted by Mr. Ward, it is reasonable for 
Brighton Corporation to apply the Foothills and Canyons 
Overlay Zone ordinance ("FCOZ") of Salt Lake County to 
Ward's proposed plans for comparison. However, to the extent 
FCOZ contains a one-acre minimum lot size, the parties have 
stipulated that the provision shall not apply. At trial, Mr. Ward 
may challenge the reasonableness of specific provisions of FCOZ 
applied by Brighton in reviewing the plans. 
Addendum Exh. E at 2 (emphasis added). Since Ward retained the right to challenge 
Brighton's application of specific FCOZ provisions, the order did not change Ward's 
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rights in any way. There was no judgment that any rejection based on FCOZ was 
reasonable and therefore valid.6 
Second, the court correctly held that it was reasonable for Brighton to require that 
the plans be signed by an architect. Although Ward contends that his plans were not 
ambiguous, it was undisputed that (1) his initial plans were "intentionally ambiguous," 
(2) at the July 13, 1995 hearing there was undisputed testimony of a 5-foot discrepancy 
between his plans and the topographical map, and (3) Brighton had rejected several 
submissions of plans on grounds of ambiguity. In addition, requiring an architect's 
signature appears to be common. See generally Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Ass'n, 666 
P.2d 1247, 1249 (Mont. 1983) (recorded development plan required plans to be prepared 
by a licensed architect). Indeed, expert architects had testified at both of the evidentiary 
hearings in the case. Although the Special Warranty Deed did not expressly require 
architect-approval, it was not unreasonable for Brighton to require that plans be signed by 
a licensed architect, and the court did not err in so holding. 
Third, the court did not err in holding it was reasonable for Brighton to require 
reimbursement of professional fees incurred in future plan reviews. Brighton had 
engaged lawyers and architects for assistance throughout these reviews and was likely to 
do so in the future. By the time of the motion, Brighton had incurred over $60,000 in 
legal costs alone. Moreover, other reviewers (governmental entities) charge for plan 
review. Brighton was incurring extraordinary costs and it was reasonable for it to recoup 
6
 Furthermore, Ward's attorney stated in oral argument that "Well, I think they can 
consider them [FCOZ provisions] if they are reasonable." Transcript, Plaintiffs Motion 
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some of those costs. Moreover, Ward had never up to that point submitted plans 
consistent with the district court's interpretation of the intent of the restrictions that the 
cabin be "small" and "built into grade with the front door on the west side on grade." It 
was prudent to place a burden on the repeated submission of plans that tested the outer 
limits of the restrictions, and reimburse Brighton for its costs, and have the court indicate 
in advance that such a requirement was reasonable. Moreover, the court reserved 
Ward's right to challenge the amount of the costs at trial. 
For these reasons, granting the motion for partial summary judgment was correct. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO CONSIDER THE OCTOBER 1999 PLANS. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Brighton properly 
refused to consider the October 1999 Plans and that the October 1999 Plans were not to 
be considered at trial. 
First, in July 1999 Ward repudiated the settlement and declared his intention to go 
to trial on the unreasonableness of Mrs. Barton's actions. At that time, only the April 
1999 Plans and June 1999 Plans had been submitted. Ward then requested a trial date, 
which was set at the September 8, 1999 pretrial conference. Accordingly, at the time trial 
was requested and set, the October 1999 Plans had not been submitted and were not at 
issue. Although the Order Granting Brighton's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
stated that the issue for trial was whether plans submitted after March 3,1999 complied 
with the settlement agreement, the only plans submitted at the time of the motion were 
the April 1999 Plans and June 1999 Plans. The court therefore did not abuse its 
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discretion in interpreting the order to refer only to the April 1999 Plans and June 1999 
plans. 
Second, the October 1999 Plans were clearly not submitted pursuant to the 
settlement agreement. The settlement required specific changes to the "June 3, 1998 
chalet plans," which placed the cabin in a specific location on the site. One of the 
requirements of the agreement was that the "upper surface of the first floor" would be at 
116' 10". Contrary to the settlement, the October 1999 Plans rotated the cabin on the site 
and raised the elevation to 119 feet. These two inconsistencies were described in Ward's 
transmittal letter accompanying the plans. Plainly, the October 1999 Plans were not 
submitted pursuant to the settlement agreement but were a proposal for a new agreement, 
which Brighton could accept or reject. Brighton was entitled to reject the plans without 
conducting a full review. < 
Third, after its rejection of the June 1999 Plans, Brighton requested reimbursement 
of its fees incurred in reviewing those plans, which Ward refused to pay. Brighton 
i 
therefore declined to review the October 1999 Plans in part because Ward refused to pay 
the fees. Moreover, Brighton's right to reimbursement was not removed by the 
settlement. The partial summary judgment declared it was not unreasonable for Brighton * 
to require such reimbursement. That conclusion would be true any time there were 
multiple submissions. The fact that reimbursement of costs was not mentioned as part of 
the settlement does not mean the parties had impliedly agreed that what had been 
reasonable was now unreasonable. Indeed, the repeated submission of plans (just as 
\ 
before) after the agreement demonstrated the continued reasonableness of Brighton's 
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request for reimbursement of costs. Accordingly, Brighton had the right to refuse to 
review the October 1999 Plans, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling 
that such plans would not be considered at trial. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE APRIL 1999 
PLANS AND JUNE 1999 PLANS DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
The district court's conclusion at trial — that Ward had not complied with the 
settlement agreement — was correct. The court made essentially only one explicit 
finding—that the plans were not final plans—and also concluded that the plans did not 
comply with the settlement agreement. In this case, since the court made no findings of 
fact, this Court "assume[s] that the trier of facts found them in accord with its decision, 
and [this Court] affirm[s] the decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable to find 
facts to support it." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) (internal quotes 
omitted). 
The district court's oral finding that the plans were not final must be upheld 
because it was not clearly erroneous. Kimble Shaw, the architect who drafted the plans, 
testified that the April 1999 Plans were in the process of correction in July 1999 when 
Ward instructed him to stop work. It was at that time that Ward had repudiated the 
settlement and declared his intention to go to trial. Shaw also testified that the June 1999 
Plans were separate, supplemental drawings, not final plans. Indeed, it became apparent 
during trial that Brighton had rejected plans that were never intended as final, but that no 
one ever notified Brighton of that fact, even after the rejection. Ward's own testimony, 
that the plans were not final, but would have been final if Brighton had accepted them, 
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was not credible, particularly in light of Shaw's testimony. Because the settlement 
agreement required submission of final plans, the court correctly concluded that the plans 
did not comply. 
Several additional discrepancies were demonstrated with undisputed evidence. 
First, the evidence showed that the drawings of the north porch were noncompliant. The 
agreement specified that the "heavy black line" was insufficient to show how the north 
porch would fit into the existing grade, and referred Ward to drawings that had been 
submitted in 1994 as examples of what was required. Moreover, although Shaw testified 
that the requested drawings were unnecessary for an architect's review, he admitted that 
he knew what was requested and failed to prepare such a drawing. R. 1751:402-04. The 
settlement agreement was breached on this point. 
Second, the site plans undeniably included language characterizing Brighton's < 
waterline easement as a new easement that Ward would convey to Brighton, not an 
easement that was already in existence. Such language clearly violated the settlement 
agreement. Although the district court was mainly concerned that it was located correctly 
on the site plan, the court did not find that the easement as stated complied with the 
settlement. R. 1750: 145-48. The court agreed it had to be "confirmed." Id. < 
Third, Kimble Shaw admitted the sewer line was placed incorrectly. The court 
commented that the sewer line placement was not a major concern to him, but , 
acknowledged that "the agreement is there." R. 1752:597. 
Fourth, there was no dispute that the retaining wall was over six feet high. 
i 
Although Ward testified that one corner of the wall was less than six feet, he admitted 
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that the other corner was eight feet high. R. 1751:514. Moreover, Shaw and Neil 
Richardson both testified that the wall was over six feet high. R. 1750:164; R. 1751:407. 
Indeed, even Carl Eriksson, on voir dire, admitted that the wall was over six feet high. 
R. 1750:228. Because the February 22,1999 letter specified that a retaining wall over six 
feet high violates FCOZ, the wall clearly violated the settlement agreement. 
Fifth, although Ward claims his survey showed adequate detail, it was undisputed 
at trial that no updated survey was provided with the April 1999 Plans or June 1999 
Plans. Because an updated survey was required, Ward's failure to provide one was 
another undeniable violation of the settlement agreement. 
Sixth, Ward's duty to provide a colorboard and transparency of the Sneidman 
survey was not excused by the fact he had submitted them in previous years in 
connection with other plans. The settlement (October 28,1998 letter) required the 
transparency to be submitted with the final plans, and stated that the colorboard "also 
needs to be submitted" to Brighton. Addendum Exh. J at 5-6. It is undisputed that Ward 
failed to comply. 
Seventh, the settlement agreement required that the "support documents" be 
submitted. Addendum Exh. J at 6. Ward's failure to do so is undisputed. Ward's 
excuse, that submission of such documents (which had been submitted to Salt Lake 
County) was unnecessary because he would not be re-submitting them to Salt Lake 
County, is merely an argument with the settlement agreement, and of no effect. 
The submitted April 1999 Plans and June 1999 Plans clearly violated the 
settlement agreement in numerous ways. The October 28,1998 letter, which was part of 
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the settlement, stated that "All of the drawings and documents requested must be 
furnished. Each item noted as incorrect must be remedied as outlined." Addendum Exh. 
J at 6. The court did not err in ruling that Ward had not complied with the settlement 
agreement. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
EXCLUDING CARL ERIKSSON'S TESTIMONY. 
Ward incorrectly argues that the district court abused its discretion in excluding 
Carl Eriksson because Eriksson could have provided helpful expert testimony (1) that the { 
plans were final, (2) that the plans complied with FCOZ, and (3) that the plans were 
sufficiently clear and detailed. Ward's argument fails on all three issues. As Ward 
acknowledges, Eriksson was excluded because he had not read the settlement agreement, 
which was the test for compliance, and because his fact testimony (that the plans were 
approved by Salt Lake County) was irrelevant. 
A district court's decision to exclude expert testimony will not be overturned in 
the absence of an abuse of discretion. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1361 (Utah 1993). < 
Experts may testify if their "specialized knowledge" will "assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 
i 
781 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Utah R. Evid. 702). Further, "[t]he 
probative value of evidence is determined on the basis of need and 'its ability to make the 
existence of a consequential fact either more or less probable.'" Id. (quoting State v. * 
Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Utah 1989)). 
Eriksson's testimony that the April 1999 Plans and June 1999 Plans, considered 
together, were final plans was unhelpful in light of the fact that Kimble Shaw, who 
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drafted the plans, stated they were not final. Indeed, Shaw acknowledged mistakes in the 
April 1999 Plans that were not corrected in the June 1999 Plans. R. 1751: 360, 366, 417. 
Shaw testified that he was in the process of making corrections when Ward instructed 
him to stop work. R. 1751:421. Shaw was certainly qualified to assess whether his own 
plans were final, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude that it 
would not have been helpful for Eriksson, a non-architect, to opine that they were. 
Eriksson's testimony that the plans complied with FCOZ also would not have been 
helpful. Ward, Shaw, and Eriksson (in response to a question from the court during voir 
dire) all admitted that the retaining wall was over six feet high. The settlement 
agreement, in the February 22, 1999 letter, stated "A retaining wall of more than six feet 
would violate the standards set out in [FCOZ]." Addendum Exh. K at 2. The settlement 
agreement was intended to set out objective criteria for compliance. Thus, even though 
Eriksson intimated that FCOZ "could probably be interpreted" to allow a retaining wall 
over six feet high, R. 1750:228-29, the parties had already explicitly agreed that such a 
wall would not comply. Allowing Eriksson to testify on that point would have frustrated 
the agreement's helpful specificity. Accordingly, Eriksson's testimony on that issue 
would have been unhelpful. 
Furthermore, the settlement agreement defined issues separate from whether the 
plans were clear and detailed. Brighton had specifically stated that the "heavy black line" 
was not sufficient, and had clearly described the type of drawings that would comply. 
Shaw admitted he understood what drawings were requested and that he did not prepare 
them because he believed they were unnecessary. R. 1751: 401-04. Eriksson's proffered 
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testimony that the plans submitted were sufficiently detailed and thus the requested 
drawings were unnecessary did not address the issue — compliance with the agreement ~ 
and thus would not have been helpful. Eriksson's testimony also would have been 
cumulative with Shaw's. 
Finally, Eriksson's fact testimony that the plans were approved by Salt Lake 
County was irrelevant. The issue was whether the plans complied with the settlement 
agreement, not whether the plans were or would be approved by Salt Lake County, which 
was not a party to the agreement. The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 
Eriksson's testimony. 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
HOLDING THAT BRIGHTON DID NOT UNREASONABLY WITHHOLD 
ITS CONSENT TO 1995 PLANS. 
On July 13, 1995, at Ward's request the court held a second evidentiary regarding 
plans Ward submitted to Brighton. At the first hearing in 1994, the court granted a 
preliminary injunction in favor of Brighton and found among other things, that Ward's 
plans were "intentionally ambiguous," that the basement and "attic" were intended for 
living space in violation of the two-floor restriction, and that the intent of the grantor (and 
of the other Moreton siblings) was that only a small cabin was to be built. The court 
found that the parties contemplated that the cabin would be built into the mountainside, 
similar to the original cabin, with the first floor opening to the west on grade. Those 
findings provided the context for the 1995 hearing. At that hearing, the court found that 
Brighton's rejection of Ward's 1995 plans was not unreasonable. 
60 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"The fundamental rule in construing restrictive covenants is that the intention of 
the parties as shown by the covenant governs." DeMund v. Lund, 690 P.2d 1316,1321 
(Haw. App.), cert denied, 744 P.2d 781 (Haw. 1984) (quoting 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants 
§ 186 (1965)); accord Freeman v. Gee, 423 P.2d 155,163 (Utah 1967). Furthermore, the 
restrictive covenants are solely for the benefit of the grantor (Brighton) and not for the 
benefit of Ward. See Metropolitan v. Sine, 376 P.2d 940, 945 (Utah 1962) (court, in 
enforcing covenant, relied on fact that the covenant "was for the sole benefit" of grantor). 
Finally, the test is not whether the plans submitted to Brighton are reasonable, but 
whether Brighton acted unreasonably or in bad faith in rejecting them. Norris v. Phillips, 
626 P.2d 717, 719 (Colo. App. 1981); McNamee v. Bishop Trust Co., Ltd., 616 P.2d 205, 
209 n.10 (Haw. 1980). Thus, Ward must but cannot show that the court erred in holding 
that Brighton's rejection of the 1995 plans was not unreasonable. See, e.g., Gosnay v. 
Big Sky Owners Assn'n, 666 P.2d 1246,1250 (Mont. 1983) (no abuse of discretion in 
disapproving fence that would conflict with overall plan for "openness"). 
While Ward's 1995 plans had been tweaked technically to meet the two objective 
criteria stated in the Special Warranty Deed, i.e., there were ostensibly two floors of 
1,200 square feet, there were other problems giving rise to Brighton's rejection. The roof 
pitch was 8/12 and the main entrance opened on to the first floor on the north, which 
raised the first floor up above grade on the west. The result was a roof height of 31 feet 
over "construction grade." In addition, Neil Richardson testified that the size of the south 
patio was too large for the site, requiring an excessive cut in the southeast comer and 
excessively high retaining walls. Richardson also testified that the plans were 
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ambiguous, including a discrepancy between elevations shown on the drawings and 
elevations on the topography map of as much as five feet. 
Because of the ambiguous plans, Brighton expressed concern regarding the 
possibility of both a loft and a basement, issues in the first hearing. The loft was a 
concern because there was no attic framing plan, and therefore no way to rule out the loft 
overlook which Kimble Shaw admitted at the first hearing he had never seen in 
connection with an attic. Retaining the first floor entrance on the north had the effect of 
lifting the structure, with the result that the main floor was above grade on the west. 
Such a configuration implied the possibility of a basement. This was of particular 
concern because of the discrepancy between the topography shown on Ward's plans and 
the topographical map. 
Ward argues that Brighton abused its discretion because the plans did not show a 
loft, Richardson admitted a roof pitch of 8/12 technically did not violate the Wasatch 
Canyon Development Standards ("Standards"), Brighton did not show the topography on 
the plans was wrong (as opposed to the topographical map), and Salt Lake County 
officials stated (in affidavit form) that the plans complied with the Standards. However, 
these are merely a selection of some facts purportedly favorable to Ward from among all 
that was before the trial judge. Moreover, Ward does not show how Brighton was 
unreasonable in its objections to overall size, ambiguity (as described above), and Ward's 
placement of the entrance to the lower floor on the north. Ward does not point to legal 
error in the 1995 hearing nor marshal the evidence (or contradict the facts relied on by 
62 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Brighton) in a way to show the court abused its discretion in finding that Brighton did not 
act unreasonably in rejecting Ward's 1995 plans. 
VIII. JUDGE LEWIS CORRECTLY DENIED WARD'S RULE 63(b) MOTION 
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO CAUSE TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE YOUNG, 
AND THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DISQUALIFY JUDGE YOUNG 
BECAUSE THERE IS NO SHOWING OF ACTUAL BIAS. 
The heart of Ward's appeal is his attempt to secure a new judge, one who will not 
know the history of this matter. But Ward comes to this Court with an unjustified 
complaint of bias. While Ward would undoubtedly prefer a judge who has not already 
ruled that Ward submitted plans that were "intentionally ambiguous" and that the 
restrictive covenants of the Special Warranty Deed were intended to limit any structure to 
a "small cabin," the standard of impartiality protects both the prevailing party and the 
loser. After seven years of litigation, this Court should look skeptically on a request for a 
new judge, especially where as here such request clearly flows from an adverse ruling 
rather than any improper conduct. 
Ward's appeal asserts two issues as grounds for recusal. First, Ward asserts that 
Judge Lewis erred in denying his 1997 motion for recusal of Judge Young based on the 
sole fact of Mr. Jardine's signing of an advertisement endorsing Judge Young during his 
retention campaign the previous year. Second, Ward asserts that Judge Young's rulings 
have been so "unfair" that Ward has been denied due process. Neither of these 
arguments has any merit. 
A. WARD'S 1997 RECUSAL MOTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED. 
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First, Ward's 1997 motion for recusal was handled properly and was correctly 
denied. Judge Young, as is provided under Rule 63(b), referred the motion to the Chief 
Judge Lewis to determine whether a legally sufficient affidavit had been filed and thus 
whether Judge Young should be recused. A legally sufficient affidavit is one that states 
facts "sufficient to show bias, prejudice or conflict of interest." Utah R. Civ. P. 
63(b)(1997). Ward's affidavit, however, alleged only that Mr. Jardine had signed an 
advertisement in support of Judge Young's campaign for retention. Although not yet 
addressed by this Court, other jurisdictions uniformly hold that an attorney's participation 
injudicial election campaigns does not require that a judge be recused from any case in 
which the attorney appears as counsel. See, ej*., Raybon v. Burnett, 135 So.2d 228 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Aynsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 774 P.2d 103 (Nev.), cert, denied, 
493 U.S. 958 (1989); In re Disqualification of Ney, 657 N.E.2d 1367 (Ohio 1995). Ward 
has failed to cite a single case in support of a contrary proposition. 
Judge Lewis clearly applied the correct standard. Ward's argument that Judge 
Young should have been disqualified to avoid even the appearance of partiality is 
unpersuasive because it would have the effect of requiring disqualification of a judge 
whenever an attorney participant in his election campaign appears before him, contrary to 
the uniform case law described above. Thus, Judge Lewis did not err by holding that 
Ward's affidavit was defective for failure to show actual bias. 
Ward's procedural argument that Ward was not required to show actual bias "until 
after Judge Young had been approved to continue" (Appellant's Brief at 70) is incorrect. 
There is no mechanism in the trial court for showing actual bias after the judge has been 
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cleared to continue. This Court's statement in State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 
1998), that the burden shifted to the petitioners "to show actual bias or abuse of 
discretion," clearly refers to the standard for reversal on appeal, not further proceedings 
in the trial court. Id. at 979 (citing State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091,1094-95 (Utah 1988) 
("absent a showing of actual bias or an abuse of discretion, failure [of the judge to recuse 
himself] does not constitute reversible error")). 
B. JUDGE YOUNG SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED BECAUSE OF 
WARD'S ACCUSATIONS OF BIAS. 
There is also no basis for removing Judge Young on the basis of an alleged series 
of "unfair decisions" and an "asserted denial of due process."7 In the first place, Ward 
proposes the wrong standard. This Court's removal of any judge based on the possibility 
of bias, where there has been no violation of the statutory standard, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-7-1, would again put this Court in the position of removing judges based on issues 
such as election participation, which has been uniformly rejected. Moreover, there is no 
reason to remove a trial judge without also reversing the judgment. The standard should 
be the same for both decisions, as this Court has impliedly held. See State v. Neeley, 
supra, 748 P.2d at 1094-05. 
Second, there is no evidence of bias. This matter initially came before Judge 
Young in September 1994. He held an evidentiary hearing and then determined, among 
other things, that Ward had presented "intentionally ambiguous" plans, that the parties 
This second ground appears to violate Rule 63(b)'s provision that "[n]o party shall be 
entitled in any case to file more than one affidavit" since it is the functional equivalent 
of a second affidavit. 
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contemplated only a small cabin that was to be built into the hillside, and that Brighton's 
decisions on reviewing Ward's plans were to be overturned only upon a showing of an 
abuse of discretion. Ward has not appealed that order. 
After the initial hearing, Ward submitted plans that proposed a cabin slightly 
reduced in size but still measuring approximately 31 feet from the first floor to the top of 
the roof, clearly not a "small" cabin. Ward also maintained the first floor entrance on the 
north side of the cabin (halfway up the hill) in contravention of the order's finding that 
the parties contemplated that the cabin was to be built with the entrance opening on grade 
on the west. Rather than simply comply, Ward pressed and pressed and pressed, with 
continuous plans incorporating only the smallest differences in a kind of torture by a 
"thousand cuts." Finally, in 1999 as part of a settlement, Brighton agreed that the 
entrance could be placed on the north, so long as specified drawings were produced with < 
the plans to demonstrate that the entrance would not impact Brighton's waterline 
easement and so Brighton could see how the porch would fit into the existing topography. 
• I 
Instead of complying, however, Ward submitted plans contrary to the settlement, and 
when Brighton rejected the plans, repudiated the settlement and returned again to 
litigation. * 
Given these circumstances and this conduct, as can be seen from the record, Judge 
Young's decisions were correct. Further, even if Ward were correct, more than mere 
error is required to demonstrate actual bias justifying removal of the judge. In re 
Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Utah 1997) (Zimmerman, C.J., sitting alone) 
("No deduction of bias and prejudice may be made from adverse rulings by a judge."); 
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Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555,114 S. Ct. 1147,1157 (1994) ("Judicial 
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion"); State 
ex rel. Miller v. Richardson, 229 Kan. 234, 238, 623 P.2d 1317,1322 (1981) (adverse 
erroneous rulings do not justify removal of judge). 
Finally, there is absolutely no showing by Ward of the kind of courtroom behavior 
demonstrating bias that this Court has required for the extraordinary remedy of removal. 
In Bunnell v. Industrial Commission, 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987), an administrative law 
judge intimidated one party's witnesses, dismissed his attorney's arguments without 
hearing them, rejected admissible evidence without any apparent basis, and openly 
referred to the "rehearing," as if the decision was already made. As a result, witnesses 
were "chilled" to the point that they were prevented from presenting admissible 
testimony for fear of upsetting the judge. 
Ward has made no such showing. Judge Young has been more than patient with 
Ward. Judge Young has held multiple hearings, including emergency hearings, and took 
almost one-half day to visit the property. Additionally, Ward and his numerous attorneys 
have been treated with respect, as have his witnesses. For instance, at the conclusion of 
trial, Judge Young commented that he was "impressed" with the testimony of Kimble 
Shaw, Ward's architect, who appeared to be acting in good faith, notwithstanding that the 
plans he prepared did not comply with the agreement. Other than a series of adverse 
rulings, the only specific acts pointed to by Ward to show bias are the ruling on paving of 
the road, the trial of the matter on the April and June 1999 plans, and not the October 
1999 plans, and the granting of Brighton's motion to exclude the testimony of Carl 
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Eriksson at trial, all of which are explained above as correct rulings.8 Ward simply offers 
no cognizable basis for his request. 
Ward's attempt to remove Judge Young is simply a further effort by Ward to 
judge-shop and to avoid the consequences of his prior deceptions and conduct in this 
case. But Ward is not entitled to present his claims to a judge who is unfamiliar with his 
prior behavior. Brighton's rights must be protected as well, and Brighton, with its own 
reasons to doubt Ward's good faith, is entitled to have its decisions reviewed by the judge 
who is well-acquainted, by reason of his own experience in this case, with the need to 
rigorously test the accuracy and compliance of Ward's plans. See generally Litkey v. 
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551, 114S.Ct. 1147, 1155 (1994) ("Impartiality is not 
gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean child-like innocence. If the judge did not 
form judgments of the actors in those court-house dramas called trials, he could never 
render decisions."). For these reasons, this Court should affirm Judge Lewis's denial of 
the motion for recusal and should reject Ward's request for assignment of a new judge. 
Ward also asserts that "on at least two occasions . . . Judge Young announced his 
decision on motions before we had reviewed them . . . " Appellant's Brief at 71. Ward 
does not cite to the record and thus this assertion cannot be tested. However, it is 
Brighton's counsel's recollection that, as do many judges on occasion in response to an 
anticipated motion, Judge Young advised the parties of his preliminary thoughts but 
clearly stated he would review any motion filed and decide on the merits at that time. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Brighton requests that the judgment be affirmed in its 
entirety. 
DATED this ay of September, 2000. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
James S. Jardine 
Scott A. Hagen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Appellee 
Brighton Corporation 
549100 
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Mai l t a x n o t i c e t o te+X&i / / COATS A d d r e s s 7 ? £ . 7 3 n ^ / / ' P 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , o r g a n i z e d and e x i s t i n g 
u n d e r t h e l a w s of t h e S t a t e o f U t a h , w i t h i t s p r i n c i p a l o f f i c e a t S a l t 
L a k e C i t y , o f C o u n t y of S a l t L a k e , S t a t e of U t a h , GRANTOR, h e r e b y 
CONVEYS AND WARRANTS a g a i n s t a l l c l a i m i n g by , t h r o u g h o r u n d e r i t t o 
ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M. COATS, a s J o i n t T r u s t e e s of t h e I s a b e l 
M. C o a t s T r u s t d a t e d D e c e m b e r 1 0 , 1 9 8 5 , GRANTEES, o f M e r c e d , 
C a l i f o r n i a , f o r t h e sum of TEN DOLLARS ( $ 1 0 . 0 0 ) and o t h e r g o o d and 
v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d t r a c t of l a n d i n 
S a l t Lake C o u n t y , S t a t e of U t a h : 
B e g i n n i n g a t t h e N o r t h w e s t c o r n e r of Lo t 29 , B l o c k 4, 
S i l v e r Lake Summer R e s o r t , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e o f f i c i a l 
p l a t t h e r e o f on f i l e and of r e c o r d i n t h e S a l t L a k e 
C o u n t y R e c o r d e r ' s o f f i c e , and r u n n i n g t h e n c e S o u t h 
8 7 ° 3 3 ' 0 " E a s t a l o n g t h e N o r t h l i n e of s a i d Lot 29, 115.5 
f e e t ( R e c o r d e q u a l s E a s t ) ; t h e n c e S o u t h 2 ° 2 7 , 0 " W e s t 
1 9 8 . 5 f e e t t o t h e S o u t h b o u n d a r y l i n e of G r a n t o r ' s 
p r o p e r t y ; t h e n c e N o r t h 8 7 ° 3 3 ' 0 " Wes t a l o n g t h e S o u t h 
b o u n d r y l i n e of G r a n t o r ' s p r o p e r t y 115.5 f e e t ( b e i n g t h e 
p r o p e r t y conveyed t o G r a n t o r u n d e r W a r r a n t y Deed d a t e d 
1 / 2 8 / 6 1 a s r e c o r d e d 8 / 2 / 6 1 a s e n t r y number 1 7 9 1 9 9 1 i n 
Book 1827 Page 346 in t h e o f f i c e of t h e S a l t Lake County 
R e c o r d e r ) ; t h e n c e N o r t h 2 ° 2 7 ' 0 " E a s t 198.5 f e e t (Deed 
e q u a l s N o r t h ) t o t h e p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g . ( C o n t . . 5 2 6 3 
a c r e s more o r l e s s ) 
B a s i s of b e a r i n g : L i n e b e t w e e n t h e S a l t Lake C o u n t y 
M o n u m e n t f ound a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of P i n e S t r e e t and 
W a s a t c h S t r e e t t o S a l t Lake C o u n t y Mounument f o u n d i n 
P r o s p e c t S t r e e t . S a i d l i n e b e i n g S o u t h 28 D e g r e e s 43 
M i n u t e s 47 S e c o n d s E a s t a s s u r v e y e d . B e a r i n g s w e r e 
r o t a t e d 2 D e g r e e s 27 M i n u t e s c l o c k w i s e a s n e e d e d t o 
c o n f o r m t o s t r e e t c e n t e r l i n e d a t a a s shown on t h e S a l t 
Lake County a r e a r e f e r e n c e p l a t f o r S e c t i o n 35 , T o w n s h i p 
2 S o u t h , Range 3 E a s t , S a l t Lake Base and M e r i d i a n . 
RESERVING u n t o t h e G r a n t o r , i t s s u c c e s s o r s and a s s i g n s , 
a p e r m a n e n t e a s e m e n t and r i g h t - o f - w a y f o r r o a d w a y a n d 
u t i l i t y p u r p o s e s o v e r a n d a c r o s s t h e h e r e i n a f t e r 
d e s c r i b e d p r e m i s e s t o be u s e d i n common by t h e G r a n t o r 
and G r a n t e e h e r e i n , and o t h e r named G r a n t e e s of t h e 
G r a n t o r f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n , r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , m a i n t e n a n c e , 
and r e p a i r of a r o a d w a y f o r i n g r e s s and e g r e s s a n d 
u t i l i t y e a s e m e n t s f o r w a t e r l i n e s , s e w e r l i n e s , 
e l e c t r i c a l l i n e s , t e l e p h o n e l i n e s , n a t u r a l g a s l i n e s , 
and o t h e r u t i l i t i e s i n c i d e n t a l t o a r e s i d e n t i a l u s e , t o -
wi t : 
B e g i n n i n g a t t h e S o u t h w e s t c o r n e r of L o t 29 , B l o c k 4 , 
S i l v e r Lake Summer R e s o r t a c c o r d i n g t o t h e o f f i c i a l p l a t 
t h e r e o f on f i l e and of r e c o r d i n t h e S a l t Lake C o u n t y 
R e c o r d e r ' s O f f i c e , a n d r u n n i n g t h e n c e S o u t h 8 7 ° 3 3 ' 0 " 
E a s t 1 1 5 . 5 f e e t ; t h e n c e S o u t h 2 ° 8 7 ' 0 n W e s t 20 f e e t ; 
t h e n c e N o r t h 8 7 ° 3 3 ' 0 " W e s t 1 1 5 . 5 f e e t ; t h e n c e N o r t h 
2 ° 2 7 ' 0 " 20 f e e t t o t h e p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g . 
The a b o v e - n a m e d G r a n t o r , G r a n t e e , and o t h e r named G r a n t e e s t h e r e o f ^ 
s h a l l u s e t h e e a s e m e n t s and r i g h t - o f - w a y s g r a n t e d by t h i s i n s t r u m e n t a 
i n common w i t h d u e r e g a r d t o t h e r i g h t s of o t h e r s a n d t h e i r u s e o f Cf 
such easements and r i g h t - o f - w a y s , and such easements and r i g h t - o f - w a y s ^ 
s h a l l not be used in any way t h a t w i l l impair the r i g h t s of o t h e r s t o -
use i t . No pa r ty s h a l l in any way o b s t r u c t the use of s a id easements 
and r i g h t - o f - w a y s t o t h e d e t r i m e n t of o t h e r s h o l d i n g a b e n e f i c i a l 
-—- . ^ ^ n n n p n q 
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Grantor further reserves unto itself, its successors and assigns, 
a permanent waterline easement as the same now exists under the above-
described premises conveyed herein for the now existing residential 
waterline to the residence on Grantor's property together with the 
right of ingress and egress for the maintenance and repair of said 
existing water line. 
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS. The above-described premises shall be 
limited to the construction of a single residential building 
containing not in excess of twelve hundred square feet on each floor, 
and containing not more than two floors. Outside decking not under 
any roof shall not be included in said twelve hundred square foot 
limitation. 
Grantor expressly reserves the right to review and approve the 
proposed placement, plans, and designs for any improvements to be 
located upon the above-described property, which approval shall be 
timely and shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
Subject to an existing right-of-way agreement dated September 12, 
1990, between Brighton Corporation as Grantor and David S. Dransfield 
and Sarah Adelle Dransfield as Grantees, together with others in 
common as recorded September 18, 1990, in Book 6253 Page 2002, Entry 
Numoer 4967074 in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
Subject to that certain waterline easement dated June 10, 1991, 
from Brighton Corporation, Grantor, to Silver Lake Company, Grantee of 
a prepetual waterline easement 10 feet in width extending along the 
Western property line of the premises conveyed herein. 
Subject to any and all other existing right-of-ways and easements 
of record. 
Subject to the restriction that upon the transfer or sale of the 
above-described premises the named Grantor and its successors and 
assigns who are descendants of Mary M. Barton are granted a first 
right of refusal for the purchase thereof, and Fred A. Moreton and 
Lucy W. Moreton and their descendants are granted a second right of 
refusal for the purchase thereof. A sale or transfer of the above-
described premises to the descendants of Isabel M. Coats shall be 
exempt from said described first and second rights of refusal but said 
terms shall be binding upon the transfer of said premises to any party 
not a descendant of Isabel M. Coats. 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and 
the transfer represented thereby was duly authorized under a 
resolution duly adopted by the Board of Directors of the Grantor at a 
lawful 'meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor has caused its corporate name and 
seal to be hereunto affixed by its duly authorized officers this 
"
7
 day of v; C i • 1991. 
- / 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , 
?y ;>"-" ^ -y-— /. 
BY:/^^ 
M< 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake) 
0 n fc
^
e
 3* day °f "TV ^}' 1991, before me, the undersigned, a 
Notary Public in and for s'aid/County and State, personally appeared 
MARY MORETON BARTON, known to be to be the President of BRIGHTON 
CORPORATION, the corporation that executed the within instrument, and 
known to me to be the person who executed the witnin instrument on 
behalf of the corporation herein named, and he duly acknowledged to me 
that said corporation executed the same in pursuance of a resolution 
of its Board of Directors. , J 
NOTARY PUBLIC J /g&*0>. 
Mv Commi«;cion Fvr*i.-~~-
Mapy Moreton Barton, President 
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Third J^tiiyi^Difitrict 
OCT <t « 
James S. Jardine (A1647) 
Robert P. Hill (A1492) 
Scott A. Hagen (A4840) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
79 South Main Street, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OK THE THIR D JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
ooOoo 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION AND DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940905453 
Judge David S. Young 
v. 
ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M. 
COATS, individually and as 
Trustees of the Isabel M. 
Coats Trust dated December 10, 
1985, GREGORY M. WARD, an 
individual, DOUG'S TREE 
SERVICE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and UNKNOWN PER-
SONS designated as JOHN DOE 
NO. 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Brighton Corporation's motion for preliminary 
injunction came on for hearing on September 6 and 7# 1994 before 
the Honorable David S. Young District ( ourt Judge. James S. 
Jardine and Scott A. Hagen appeared as counsel for Brighton 
Corporation. David M. Connors, Kenneth J. Sheppard and Kevin C. 
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Marcoux appeared as counsel for defendant Gregory M. Ward and 
appeared specially on behalf of defendants Isabel M. Coats and 
Walter M. Coats in their individual capacity and as Trustees of 
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated December 10, 1985 (referred to 
collectively herein as "defendants"). 
The Court heard testimony from Mary Moreton Barton, 
Fred Moreton, Neil Richardson, Kimble Shaw, Gregory M. Ward, and 
William Lifferth. The Court also received the affidavits of Paul 
Kunz, Sarah Kunz, Edward Moreton and Frederick A. Moreton, Jr. 
and the amended affidavits of Paul Kunz and Sarah Kunz. The 
Court heard argument from counsel and considered all pleadings, 
exhibits and other papers submitted by counsel in support of 
their respective positions. Based on the foregoing evidence and 
legal argument, the Court now issues this order on plaintiff's 
motion for preliminary injunction, defendants' motion to 
consolidate the hearing on the preliminary injunction with the 
trial on the merits, defendants' motion to exclude extrinsic 
evidence regarding the intent of the parties, and plaintiff's 
cause of action for a declaratory judgment on the meaning of the 
phrase "two floors" in the Special Warranty Deed. 
STIPULATIONS 
1. The parties stipulated that the hearing on the 
motion for preliminary injunction would be consolidated with the 
trial on the merits for the purpose of obtaining a ruling on the 
2 
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meaning of the phrase "two floors" in the restrictive covenants 
o£ the Special Wain: aiity Deed Accordi nqi' 1 y defendants' motion to 
consolidate is granted solely as to that issue. 
2. The parties stipulated that, for purposes of the 
1200 square foot limitation per floor in the Special Warranty 
Deed, any proposed building should be measured from exterior wall 
to exterior wall, however
 ( flip Ht ipuJal inn did nof adrin ss the 
issue of the calculation of square footage of decking under a 
roof • 
3. On the second day of the hearing, defendants moved 
to continue the hearing. In conjunction with the motion for 
continuance, defendants offered to stipulate to the issuance of a 
br i.ef preliminary injunction until such time as defendants 
submitted revised plans to plaintiff and plaintiff either 
approved the plans o? a court: ruled that disapproval was 
unreasonable. Plaintiff objected to defendants' motion for 
continuance and asked the court to go forward with 1 he h^ai ing. 
Defendanty motion to continue was denied. 
FINDINGS 
4. Defendant Gregory M. Ward has indicated an intent 
to begin the process of constructing a recreational cabin on a 
parcel of land in Salt Lake County, Utah, which land is more 
particular I y elescri bed as f o J1 owe i 
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Lot 29, 
Block 4, Silver Lake Summer Resort, according 
3 
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to the official plat thereof on file and of 
record in the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
office, and running thence South 87°33'0" 
East along the North line of said Lot 29, 
115,5 feet (Record equals East); thence South 
2o27'0" West 198.5 feet to the South boundary 
line of Grantor's property; thence North 
87°33'0" West along the South boundary line 
of Grantor's property 115.5 feet (being the 
property conveyed to Grantor under Warranty 
Deed dated 1/28/61 as recorded 8/2/61 as 
entry number 1791991 in Book 1827 Page 346 in 
the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder); 
thence North 2°27'0" East 198.5 feet (Deed 
equals North) to the point of beginning. 
Basis of bearing: Line between the Salt Lake 
County Monument found at the intersection of 
Pine Street and Wasatch Street to Salt Lake 
County Monument found in Prospect Street. 
Said line being South 28 Degrees 48 Minutes 
47 Seconds East as surveyed. Bearings were 
rotated 2 Degrees 27 Minutes clockwise as 
needed to conform to street centerline data 
as shown on the Salt Lake County area 
reference plat for Section 35, Township 2 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
(the "Subject Property"). 
5. The Subject Property is subject to certain 
restrictive covenants and promises contained in a Special 
Warranty Deed dated July 3# 1991 from Brighton Corporation to 
Isabel and Walter M. Coats as trustees for the Isabel M. Coats 
Trust. 
6. The Special Warranty Deed includes the following 
restrictive covenants which are pertinent to this order: 
The above-described premises shall be limited 
to the construction of a single residential 
building containing not in excess of twelve 
4 
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hundred square feet on each floor, and 
containing not more than two floors Outside 
decking not under any roof shall not be 
included in said twelve hundred square foot 
limitation. 
Grantor expressly reserves the right to 
review and approve the proposed placement, 
plans, and designs for any improvements to be 
located upon the above-described property, 
which approval shall be timely and shall not 
be unreasonably withheld, 
(Hereinafter, the "restrictive covenants.") 
7. Plaintiff Br i ghton Corporation is the grantor of 
the Special Warranty Deed. 
8. The purposes of the foregoing covenants 'Hire, among 
other things, to preserve the private nature of plaintiff's cabin 
and the rustic nature of the surrounding lands, including the 
Subject Property, to limit the intrusion ol high traffic and/or 
high activity level developments into plaintiff's property from 
the Subject Property, and to preserve the natural view from 
pj aintif.f " s cabin. 
9. The restrictive covenants in the Special Warranty 
Deed are clear and unambiguous, and the terms of those covenants 
are to be construed according to their ordinary, popular usage. 
10. The term "floor" in the Special Warranty Deed 
means the surface of a room upon which one normally walks that 
may be used as living space. 
5 
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11. A basement is a "floor" for purposes of the 
Special Warranty Deed if the basement is planned for or capable 
of being used as living space. 
12. An "attic" is a "floor" for purposes of the 
Special Warranty Deed if the attic is planned for or capable of 
being used as living space. 
13. With respect to the sets of plans submitted by Mr. 
Ward to Brighton Corporation on August 22, 1994 (the "Plans") for 
its approval, Ex. 6-P, the Court finds as follows: 
a. The proposed cabin has four floors within the 
meaning of the restrictive covenants of the Special Warranty 
Deed. 
b. The plans were intentionally ambiguous as to 
the type of structure actually being proposed, and as to its 
placement on the Subject Property. 
c. The proposed cabin is designed so that the 
basement is "on grade" on the west side. 
d. The attic is designed with live load 
construction and could easily be used as a loft. 
e. Brighton Corporation did not abuse its 
discretion in disapproving the Plans. 
f. The Plans do not comply with the restrictive 
covenants in the Special Warranty Deed. 
6 
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]4 Even if the restrictive covenants in the Special 
Warranty Deed had been ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence of the 
ciicumstances and intent of the parties involved shows that the 
term "floor" was to be construed in its ordinary sense as the 
surface within a room ilpon whieh one ordinarily walks. Moreover, 
the "two floor" restriction was included with the intent that the 
"two floors" be similar to the original cabin 01 i the proper ty now 
owned by Hriqhton Corporation where the first floor was built 
into grade with the front door on the west side on grade. 
15. The intent of the parties:* Wris that only a small 
cabin could be built on the Subject Property. 
16. Mr. Ward's proposed construction of the cabin 
depicted in the Plans will violate the restrictive covenants and 
thus cause irreparable harm to plaintiff which cannot be 
adequately compensated by an award of money damages. 
i 7 Because the Plans do not comply with the 
restrictive covenants, it is not necessary to balance the 
respective harms to the part: es In any event-- the threatened 
harm to plaintiff Brighton Corporation outweighs whatever damage 
this injunction may cause defendants. 
18. This injunction is not adverse to the public 
interest. 
19. For the reasons set o\ it above, then e is a 
sutHLcmtic* likelihood that plaintiff Brighton Corporation will 
7 
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prevail on the merits of its claim for permanent injunctive 
relief as to the Plans. 
ORDER 
20. Based on the foregoing findings, defendants, and 
their agents, servants, employees and attorneys are enjoined from 
undertaking construction of any improvements on the Subject 
Property without the express approval of plaintiff Brighton 
Corporation. In the event that defendants submit new and 
different proposed plans to plaintiff, which plans are then 
disapproved, defendants may apply to this Court for a 
determination of whether approval has been unreasonably withheld. 
21. Defendants will not suffer legally cognizable 
damage from having to comply with these restrictive covenants. 
Therefore, plaintiff need not post a bond in connection with this 
preliminary injunction. 
22. This preliminary injunction shall remain in full 
force and effect until dissolved by stipulation of the parties or 
by the Court pursuant to further proceedings. 
23. Defendants' motion to exclude extrinsic evidence 
of the intent of the parties is denied. 
24. Plaintiff shall have a declaratory judgment that 
the meaning of the term "floor" in the Special Warranty Deed is 
the surface of a room upon which one normally walks that may be 
used as living space. 
8 
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i^Ta, DATED this LfJ^ day of ^epfe«inKer, 1994 
BY THE COURT: 
Hon. DavidiJ^ YfoungA 
District Qourt /JudtgV 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT was hand-delivered on this ffffj&ty of September, 1994 
to the following: 
David M. Connors 
Kenneth J. Sheppard 
Kevin C. Marcoux 
LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MACRAE 
136 South Main, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
/)fiy/r> }/£uu d*. rfJJsJ^ 
0091878.01 
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JAMES S. JARDINE (A1647) 
ROBERT P. HILL (A1492) 
SCOTT A. HAGEN (A4840) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
79 South Main Street, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER DENYING APPLICATION 
FOR DETERMINATION THAT 
CONSENT HAS BEEN 
UNREASONABLY WITHHELD 
ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M. 
COATS, individually and as Trustees of 
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated December 
10, 1985, GREGORY M. WARD, an 
individual, DOUG'S TREE SERVICE, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and 
UNKNOWN PERSONS designated as 
JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 940905453 
Judge David S. Young 
—ooOoo— 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on July 13, 1995. At issue was 
defendant Gregory Ward's ("Ward") Application for Determination that Consent Has Been 
Unreasonably Withheld ("Application"). James S. Jardine and Scott A Hageii appeared as 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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counsel for Brighton Corporation. David M. Connors appeared as counsel for Ward. Prior 
to the hearing, the Court received and reviewed Ward's Application and memorandum in 
support (along with exhibits), plaintiffs memorandum in opposition, and Ward's reply 
memorandum in support. At the hearing, the Court heard testimony from Ward and from 
Neil Richardson, plaintiffs architect. 
Based on the papers submitted by counsel and the testimony and exhibits presented at 
the hearing, the Court finds that the plans submitted by Ward for approval by Brighton 
Corporation do not adequately comply with the restrictive covenants of the special warranty 
deed or this court's previous order granting preliminary injunction. The Court therefore 
concludes that Brighton Corporation did not act unreasonably in rejecting the plans. 
Accordingly, the Court denies Ward's Application for Determination that Consent Has 
Been Unreasonably Withheld. 
DATED this l> flay of August, 1995. 
0134524.01 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify thnt ,t Ini: cid i orriv' rop\ of the foregoing OKDhR 
DENYING APPUCATION FOR DETERMINATION THAT CONSENT HAS BEEN 
UNREASONABLY WITHHELD was hand-delivered on this /* rday of August, 1995 to 
the following: 
David M. Connors 
Kenneth J. Sheppard 
Kevin C. Marcoux 
LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MACRAE 
136 South Main, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
/jWfct (K, l^^w 
0134524.01 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHTON CORP., : COURTfS RULING 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO, 940905453 
vs. : 
ISABEL M. COATS, : 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter was referred by the assigned Judge 
to the Presiding Judge, after the former denied recusal, 
determining that petitioner's affidavit of bias and prejudice was 
legally insufficient. This referral has been handled in accordance 
with Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 63(b) governs 
mandatory disqualification and does not relate to discretionary 
recusal by the challenged judge. See, State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 
1091, 1094-95 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted 
the corresponding rule of criminal procedure, Rule 29, to require 
a showing of actual bias before disqualification is mandated. Id. ; 
see also. State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925-26 (Utah App. 1990). 
Consequently, petitioner's affidavit of bias and prejudice must 
establish actual bias before disqualification of the assigned judge 
is required. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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BRIGHTON V. COATS PAGE FOUR COURT'S RULING 
The Affidavit herein alleges that the affiant "believes" the 
assigned Judge may be biased because opposing counsel (and other 
members of his firm) were listed along with some 75-100 other 
individuals in a pre-election ad (from the fall of 1996) supporting 
the retention of the assigned Judge. A mere conclusory opinion or 
belief that the assigned judge is or may be biased is insufficient 
for recusal, unless the belief is based on facts demonstrating bias 
in fact. 
Affiant has not stated, in the Affidavit or in accompanying 
Motion to Recuse or Memorandum in Support, any facts supportive of 
actual bias. An unsupported "concern about possible impartiality" 
is legally insufficient for a recusal. 
Additionally, Rule 63(b) requires that an affidavit ". . .be 
filed as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or 
such bias or prejudice is known." It would appear that petitioner 
knew of the circumstances underlying this claim of alleged bias, in 
October or early November of 1996, and has done nothing until the 
Motion was filed on May 16, 1997. This significant delay is noted 
and appears inconsistent with a sincerely held belief in the 
existence of either actual bias or the appearance of bias or 
impropriety. 
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BRIGHTON V. COATS PAGE THREE COURT'S RULING 
For the foregoing reasons recusal is denied. This matter is 
referred back to the assigned judge for further proceedings and 
disposition. 
/LESLIE A. LEWIS 
PRESIDING JUDGE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
nn'/PO 
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James S. Jardine (A1647) 
Scott A. Hagen (A4840) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, #500 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
(801)532-1500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
COUNTY 
°«PuJ7c/erv 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M. 
COATS, individually and as Trustees of the 
Isabel M. Coats Trust dated December 10, 
1985, GREGORY M. WARD, an individual, 
DOUG'S TREE SERVICE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and UNKNOWN PERSONS 
designated as JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 940905453 
Judge David S. Young 
—ooOoo— 
Plaintiff Brighton Corporation's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came on for 
hearing at 8:30 a.m. on January 22, 1999 before the Honorable David S. Young. James S. 
Jardine and Scott A. Hagen appeared as counsel for plaintiff Brighton Corporation. Douglas J. 
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Parry appeared as counsel for defendant Gregory M. Ward. Having reviewed the legal 
memoranda, including exhibits, submitted by counsel for both parties, having heard oral 
argument from counsel, and deeming itself fully advised in the premises, 
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that Brighton Corporation's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment is GRANTED as follows: 
1. It is reasonable for Brighton Corporation, as a condition of reviewing future 
proposed plans submitted by defendant Ward, to require reimbursement of legal and professional 
fees and costs incurred as part of that review. However, Mr. Ward may challenge the 
reasonableness of such fees and costs at trial. If it is found at trial that the amount charged and 
paid is reasonable, then Brighton Corporation may keep the fees and costs paid. 
2. It is reasonable for Brighton Corporation, as a condition of reviewing any plans 
from Mr. Ward, to require that the plans be signed by a licensed architect. 
3. In reviewing plans submitted by Mr. Ward, it is reasonable for Brighton 
Corporation to apply the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone ordinance ("FCOZ") of Salt Lake 
County to Ward's proposed plans for comparison. However, to the extent FCOZ contains a one-
acre minimum lot size, the parties have stipulated that the provision shall not apply. At trial, 
Mr. Ward may challenge the reasonableness of specific provisions of FCOZ applied by Brighton 
in reviewing the plans. 
DATED this 3 day ofEebSanQ999. 
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Approved as to Form 
Douglas J. Parry 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered on this V1^- day of 
February, 1999 to the following: 
Douglas J. Parry 
PARRY, LAWRENCE & WARD 
60 East South Temple, #1270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
447151 
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CERTIFIED COPY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNT!, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs-
ISABEL M. COATS and 
WALTER M- COATS, et al. 
Defendants , 
Case No, 940905453 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 3rd day of March, 1999, 
the above-entitled matter came on for Hearing before the 
HONORABLE DAVID S« YOUNG, sitting as Judge in the above-
named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the 
following audiotape proceedings were had« 
^EXHIBIT ' PLAINTIFF%EXHIBI
EXHIBIT NO. 
CASE NO. 
DATEREC'D 
IN EVIDENCE 
CLERK A lEfRl 
A S S O C I A T E D PR'OFF.SSIONAI RppnoTco*- . ^ 
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A P P E A 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
U M C E S 
JAMES S. JARDINE, ESQ. 
SCOTT A. HAGEN, ESQ. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DOUGLAS J. PARRY, ESQ. 
PARRY MURRAY & WARD 
60 East South Temple #1270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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1 THE COURT: Good morning. The record may show we're 
2 | convened in the matter of Brighton Corporation, a Utah 
3 A corporation, versus Isabel Coats and Walter Coats, et al. 
4 The case is 9409054S3. This is the date set for trial. 
5 Counsel, will you first state your appearances, please. 
6 MR. JARDINE: James Jardine and Scott Hagen for the 
7 A Plaintiff, Brighton Corporation. 
8 I MR. PARRY: Douglas Parry for the Defendants. 
9 | THE COURT: I've been informed informally that there's 
10 A a stipulated resolution of this case, is that correct? 
11 MR. PARRY: If it can be stated correctly, yes. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Who will state it then correctly? 
13 | MR. JARDINE: Well, I have a lot of affection for Mr. 
14 H Parry; I have no doubt that he'll criticize me in 6ome 
15 | fashion for the way I do this, Your Honor, but— ' 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JARDINE: It* in fact, Your Honor, is a conditional 
settlement we'd like to read into the record. It'6 
conditional because certain actions remain to be taken. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JARDINE: We propose to state the agreement on the 
record— 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. JARDINE: —and then to formalize it later in an 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
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12 
13 
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IS 
16
 I 
17 
18 
19 
actions are satisfactorily resolved. And we would ask the 
Court to continue the trial date, and I think Mr. Parry will 
speak to that. We've agreed that we will review the 
contemplated plans to be submitted to
 U8f within seven days 
of receiving them, and I think Mr. Parry will ask you about 
available trial dates within that time frame. 
Let me see if i can state the agreement, and then we 
can deal with the trial date later, 
THE COURT: Okay, All right. 
MR. JARDINE: We sent a letter, dated October 28, 1998, 
to counsel for Mr. Ward, proposing a settlement and listing 
a number of issues, it's our understanding that Defendants 
have accepted the terms of that letter, with some additions 
and some corrections, which I will attempt to state. 
As a sort of principal point, the letter contemplates, 
and the parties agree, that Mr. Ward will submit plans, 
signed by an architect, to—for review to Brighton 
Corporation. The parties have agreed that the plans will 
meet the requirements of listing of what should be included 
20 | of two checklists provided last night by Neil Richardson to 
Kiinball Shaw, with three exceptions. They would not need to 21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
include work of a landscape architect. 
MR. PARRY: Correct. 
MR. JARDINE: They would not need to include a slope 
analysis. 
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1 UNIDENTIFIED: Okay. 
2 MR. JARDINE: And the updated and d e t a i l e d survey need 
3 U only address in d e t a i l what are cal led 'areas of 
4 disturbance" by the architects . 
5 MR. PARRY: Correct . 
6 THE COURT: Okay. 
7 MR. JARDINE: Another change is that the letter of 
8 October 28, 1996, addresses the proposed patio on the 6outh 
9 A and west of the proposed cabin. We modified our position on 
10 1 that patio in a letter dated February 22, 1999, and that 
Xi I supersedes the October 28, 1998, letter on that issue and, 
2 in general, says that they may have a patio of the outlying 
13 | of the plans submitted to us, so long as it is step-down in 
14 & compliance with "F" Cause, as to the cut. 
15 I There remains an issue outstanding that the future 
16 I plans submitted to us will address, which is the location 
17 A and design of the porch or front entrance proposed on the 
18 | north side. Brighton Corporation has not received final 
!9 plans that they regard as adequate for that proposal, 
20 | including grading plans, and Brighton Corporation will 
2i I review the plans submitted to determine whether the proposed 
22 I plan, in that respect, adversely impacts its water line, and 
">3 I t h e architects talked last night about what the detail would 
24 8 be needed for that review to be done. 
•>c H Ofcherwice. fch*» lAffarc- <-siv «-k« i < „«. *__•».-_•--
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1 || of things, and I just—I think it's clear, but the plans 
2 II will also include reference to where permanent parking would 
3 | be and, also, how construction—there'd be a description of 
4 I how construction would be staged. 
5 II As I said, the final plans, as described in the letters 
6 | and as I've described today, will be submitted to Brighton 
7 J Corporation, which will, with its architect, review the 
8 | plans and respond within seven days of receiving them. 
9 J Brighton Corporation, we—the parties agree that 
*. i] 
10 I Brighton Corporation cannot pre-approve the plans until it 
11 I sees them, but if the issues raised in the letters of 
12 J October 28, 1998, and February 22, 1999, and the noted 
13 H ambiguities are addressed and resolved, Brighton Corporation 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23' 
24 
25 
is not presently aware of other grounds on which it would 
disapprove the plans. 
There are other issues to address* in terras of the 
proposed settlement. A terra of the proposed settlement is 
that Mr. Ward will withdraw all plans filed to date with the 
county and only file, in the future, plans approved by 
Brighton Corporation and the Court. Mr. Ward has expressed 
a concern that, under "F" Cause, there may be an argument 
that he is barred from building on his lot. The provision 
in question, as I understand it, i6 provision 19.72.030, 
'Development Standards," and under that, paragraph 2(b), 
which says: 'If— Ts**-* ~* J " Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
minimum lot size requirement. If the underlying zone 
permits a minimum lot size of smaller than one acre, then a 
lot of record, approved prior to the effective date of the 
ordinance codified in this chapter, that meets the minimum 
lot size requirement set forth in the underlying zone 
district, shall have a minimum lot size of one-half acre." 
Brighton Corporation stipulates, and I think both the 
parties stipulate, that this lot was created prior to the 
effective date, is greater than one-half acre and, 
therefore, would not be precluded from building. And we 
stipulate further that you may include such a provision in 
the final order so that that could be shown to the county. 
I should note that it is a condition of this settlement 
for Ward that if the county takes a different position, not 
withstanding that, and refuses to recognize that, then the 
settlement is not effective and Mr« Ward would be back in 
his prior position. 
Did I state that correctly? 
MR. PARRY: Yes. I'm wondering whether we need to go 
that far on it, though. It may be that we can make some 
sort of an adjustment to build on* There is— 
THE COURT: You need to be sure your voice is being 
heard clearly, Mr* Parry. 
MR. PARRY: Yeah, I'll stand. I'm not sure we want to 
25 I <TO that far b^nk- Hti4-— 
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THE COURT: Well, as I understand that provision, what 
they1re saying is, you will cooperate with the grandfather 
status that was granted to that lot at an earlier time, 
MR, JARDINE: Here is the issue- We—that I think we 
want to be clear on—we do not intend, have no desire to 
have Mr- Ward adversely affected by that requirement-
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. JARDINE: And we'll stipulate and have entered into 
an order any way to make sure that that requirement doesn't 
bar his being able to build. We—what the agreement is, 
however, is that all these prior plans, which are a source 
of contention between the parties, get withdrawn and— 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. JARDINE: —that only the plans filed are ones 
we've approved and you've approved, and that we understood, 
if that was taken care of, that wasn't a problem. So that'is 
why we structured it that way. 
MR- PARRY: Yeah. And our worry is that if all the 
plans are withdrawn— 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. PARRY: —that the county will then say this is 
something new, and we readdress this issue. You know, if we 
could get an order from the Court that says the Court has 
found that it fits within that exception, therefore, can— 
you know, anything—we're not adverse, obviouslv- fcn Digitized by the Ho ard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reub n Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 || withdrawing the plans. We just want to build the cabin. 
2 || THE COURT: You just don't want to be prejudiced by 
3 || that withdrawal, in the event that they say you're starting 
4 || afresh? 
5 MR. PARRY: That's correct. And we're— 
6 THE COURT: Well, and then I think they're—I think Mr. 
7 I Jardine's position is consistent with supporting that 
8 | position • 
9 MR. PARRY: I think so. I just wanted it (inaudible). 
10 THE COURT: So, I would be happy to sign a stipulated 
11 I order that indicates that the withdrawal of the plans is not 
12 I a withdrawal of the date of the filing, but simply the 
13 A content of the plans. 
14 MR, PARRY: Yeah* That—that would probably work* 
15 J MR* JARDINE: I think that's not a problem and, indeed, 
16 | I think if we have an order just saying that this is a lot 
17 | in excess of a half acre and was created prior to the 
18 I effective date, and the parties stipulate, and the Court so 
19 orders that this doesn't bar building on this lot, that's 
20 I what they really need. 
21 A THE COURT: Okay* That would be fine* 
22 | MR. PARRY: My only concern, Jim, is I think it's less 
23 | than a half acre, but (inaudible). 
24 J MR. WARD: It's *S3* 
25 i MR. JARDINE: W#> * ~ — 
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MR- PARRY: Well, that's over. 
MR. JARDINE: We agree it's over a half acre, so it's 
not an issue. 
MR. PARRY: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, fine. 
MR. JARDINE: (Inaudible). 
MR. HAGEN: It can't be less than (inaudible). 
MR. JARDINE: All right. Next, there has been an issue 
about conforming the legal description of the roadway 
easement in the Special Warranty Deed to actually reflect 
the— 
THE COURT: To the location. 
MR. JARDINE: —that—where it's actually located. And 
I think we're in agreement that that can be done. And I've 
made a—the one thing we didn't finally decide is, I've made 
a proposal that, since they're going to have a surveyor 
updating his survey, that they get the exact—have him 
include in his work the exact legal description of the road, 
and we'll bear the cost of having the new deed prepared. 
Next, with regard to Brighton Corporation's waterline 
easement, which comes across the property, the proposed 
resolution is that the claim of trespass and relocation 
would be dismissed, if everything else is resolved; that the 
parties would agree that there is an 18-foot easement for 
the waterline, but that Bricrhton Comnn»f<AH ~~- -- • Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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waterline within that easement, no other utilities or other 
uses; and that the final order would specifically say that 
Brighton Corporation may go on Ward's property only to 
repair the—repair and maintain the line, and only upon 
reasonable notice of when it intends to do so to Mr. Ward, 
MR, PARRY: Written? 
MR- JARDINE: Written? That's fine, it can be written. 
THE COURT: I'm assuming that that would exclude some 
kind of emergency situation. A waterline— 
MR. PARRY: Yeah. 
THE COURT: A waterline is something that can have a 
sudden break. 
MR. JARDINE: I assumed that—my use of the word 
"reasonable"— 
THE COURT: Uh-huh« 
MR. JARDINE: — I thought meant that if you have an 
emergency, immediate dealing with it is reasonable— 
MR. PARRY: (Inaudible). 
MR, JARDINE: —and the only problem is that written 
notice then makes that more difficult. Any problem with 
having that clarification? 
MR. PARRY: No, that's a fine clarification. 
MR. JARDINE: In an emergency, we're able to deal with 
it immediately. 
THE COURT: Yeah, obv 
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MR. JARDINE: Further, we have agreed that within that 
18-foot easement, Ward may also locate his utilities, one or 
more of his utilities, if necessary, so long as the location 
of them and their relationship to the existing waterline 
meets all applicable regulations, ordinances, and codes. 
And further, that if any of Ward's utilities will cross the 
waterline, that Ward will provide, in advance of undertaking 
any such utility construction, to provide Brighton 
Corporation with its construction plans so that Brighton 
Corporation may determine whether the proposed plans may 
cause injury to Brighton Corporation's waterline-
We want to state on the record what we've advised Mr. 
Parry—and I think he€s agreeable—that it's recognized by 
the parties that this is a unique waterline, that it's a 
continuous, high-pressure, high-density, polyethylene line, 
with special compaction and layering construction, and that 
if it's crossed by any of—and also that it's sensitive to 
temperature—and that if it's crossed by Ward, one of Ward's 
utilities, that it will be completely restored to its 
compaction and all of the necessary conditions for the 
maintenance of the line, by Ward, and that—we want to state 
on the record that, because it's susceptible to injury, 
because it's a continuous line, a break and patch is not an 
adequate solution for this kind of line, as opposed to other 
kinds of lines, so that great care needs «-/% K~ *--•-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 | respect to that, and so I think the fact that it would have 
2 I to comply with all applicable regulations, ordinances, and 
3 I code, and we'd have a chance to review it in advance, would 
4 | be satisfactory to us. But it's a sensitive issue that I 
5 | just want to note for the record. 
6 I I understand that if all of this is achieved and 
7 A accomplished and finally resolved, that all other claims 
. 8 I between the parties would be dismissed and that a final 
9 I order would be entered with the Court, setting forth all of 
10 | the terms of the settlement, attaching the plans, and that 
11 | giving the parties, giving Brighton Corporation reasonable 
12 | rights of inspection to ensure compliance in the 
13 I construction phase with the plans the Court has approved* 
14 | And we can work—I'm just saying reasonable now, the 
15 | details of which, but, I mean, we're talking about notice 
16 | and reasonable time and that sort of thing. 
17 J THE COURT: All right. 
18 I MR. JARDINE: I believe that states the agreement-
19 J THE COURT: All right- Mr- Parry, you've heard the 
20 | agreement, do you concur? 
2iJ MR. PARRY: (Inaudible). 
22 II MR. JARDINE: Well, I mentioned it. 
23 | MR. PARRY: Oh, did we you? Okay. 
24 I MR. JARDINE: Let me just be clear, because I cited the 
25 fl three exceptions Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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MR. PARRY: That's right, that's right- Okay. 
MR. JARDINE: Okay. 
THE COURT: Keep your discussions audible to the 
record. 
MR. PARRY: Yeah. There are only two things, and one 
of them just came up this morning, and that's to have an 
architect sign. My understanding i6 to have a certified 
engineer—that's the one who's going to really draw the site 
plan—and I wanted to make sure that was no problem—a 
certified engineer on the site plan. 
MR. JARDINE: And— 
MR. PARRY: I t ' s r e a l l y not an a r c h i t e c t ' s — y o u asked— 
THE COURT: I t ' s not an a r c h i t e c t ' s drawing, r i g h t ? 
MR. PARRY: T h a t ' s r i g h t . 
MR. JARDINE: Can I j u s t ask j u s t t h i s ques t ion? 
THE COURT: Yes, c e r t a i n l y . 
MR. JARDINE: We—this h a s n ' t been d i s c u s s e d . 
UNIDENTIFIED: ( I n a u d i b l e ) . 
MR. JARDINE: Let me j u s t c l a r i f y t h i s . Are you 
t a l k i n g a b o u t t h e s i t e p lan , wi thout a r e n d e r i n g of t h e 
cabin on i t ? 
MR. SHAW: No. The cabin ( i n a u d i b l e ) . 
MR. JARDINE: Don't we need, any t ime the cabin € s shown 
on t h e s i t e p l a n , t o a l so have the—excuse me—to a l s o have 
the a r c h i t e c t s i g n i t , so that h e € s cert i fvinrr *rh*r-~ *•*<* Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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grade elevations are? 
MR. SHAW: That wouldn't be a problem. 
MR. JARDINE: To have both? Okay- That's fine. 
MR. PARRY: Your Honor, I don't know if you remember 
Mr- Kimball Shaw? 
THE COURT: Yes, I do remember. I've known Kimball 
Shaw a substantial period of his life. 
MR. PARRY: Oh. 
THE COURT: We also have been members of the Virginia 
Heights Tennis Club, where Mr. Shaw's father was somehow 
invested with the presidency for about a third of his life, 
but even there. So, I—but I'm not personally acquainted 
with Mr. Shaw, other than that. I wouldn't describe it as 
social—it's casual. 
MR. JARDINE: Before you get to the calendar, I forget 
two other things, Your Honor, in trying to rush this. One 
of the issues is whether the road would be paved. It€s our 
understanding that if this goes through, we would pave the 
road, at Brighton Corporation's expense. 
And we raised an issue, and it's one that we raised at 
the end, and there«s some confusion about it. So, this is 
more to get clarification. We think, at one point, a 
conditional use permit was sought for this building, which 
we understand, maybe correctly or incorrectly, would permit 
it to be a bed and breakfast, and v#* -5ti*;t- 4-fc<«u .—.. —** « 
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permitted use permit, and we'd like to just be clear. 
MR. PARRY: I think that's one of the statements in the 
letter. 
MR. JARDINE: So you're fine on that? 
MR. PARRY: So, we're (inaudible). Yeah. 
MR. JARDINE: I mean, I don't think we're in 
disagreement, because I don't think they intend to use 
8 | anything—than as a family cabin, but we just need to be 
9 I clear on that issue. Having stated those then, we're back 
10 A to y°u« 
11 I THE COURT: So you are clear on that, Mr- Parry, this 
12 (inaudible)? 
13 J MR, PARRY: Yes, that my understanding was the county 
14 I said, get a conditional use, a permitted use, you know, 
15 I that's fine to put a cabin up there• 
16 | THE COURT: Okay* There is no intent to use this at 
17 I any time— 
18 MR. PARRY: As a bed and breakfast? 
19 THE COURT: —as a bed and breakfast? 
20 MR. PARRY: No, no. 
2i I THE COURT: Okay* All right* 
22 MR. PARRY: The only other thing—the only one thing 
23 | was where you were talking about determining the waterlxne, 
24 | I just want it—made it clear to its prior condition. 
25 I THE COURT: That*6 what they're expecting, yes. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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MR. JARDINE: That's what I understand, yes. 
MR. PARRY: Yeah. It ju6t was—it came out a little 
differently. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, you can go ahead, Mr. Parry. 
MR. PARRY: Oh, yes. My only other thing is the time 
for trial, if necessary. I'm hoping that you'll have two 
days sometime in late April or early May. 
THE COURT: Well, let's talk about— 
MR. PARRY: Hopefully, we won't need it, but— 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's talk about that. Let me ask 
this—when would you be aware of whether you might want 
those days? How soon? 
MR. PARRY: Well— 
THE COURT; Right before the trial? 
MR. PARRY: Right before. It's going to take about 30 
days, this is what we're—that gives us a little leeway, but 
30 days to prepare the plans, to have an architect draw the 
plans. Brighton has said that they would review them within 
seven days. What we're really up against is like a June 1st 
building permit date. It takes about 30 days in the county. 
So, we would like to be able to get these to the county by 
May 1st. June is when the building season starts, and we'd 
like to be ready to go by then. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PAPPV. mi-- - -
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6orae sooner date, but we don't want to go through another 
building season. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'll tell you what I will do. 
I'm anticipating this to be a resolution of the case and, 
certainly, if it isn't, it's going to be an inconvenience to 
me, at that time, because in the interim I will have placed 
other matters on my calendar. 
MR. PARRY: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: And the only thing I will say now, why 
don't we just set a date for one of those times, so that 
we're all working upon the same page, but, hopefully, I 
guess, we'll not have to use it. I would say probably we 
ought to go to April 22nd. Is that convenient to both of 
your calendars? 
MR. PARRY: That's fine with mine. 
MR. JARDINE: Give me just one second, Your Honor. 
UNIDENTIFIED: (Inaudible). 
MR. JARDINE: Let me—I need to clarify something that 
I probably misstated. The checklist that I understand that 
Mr. Richardson and Mr. Shaw talked about, actually has some 
steps along the way, as I understood it. That is, that 
there are some things that you get before you get the final 
6et of plans. Now, maybe I'm misunderstanding it, but if 
that's—that may or may not change the dates, but if we get 
25 fl all of that in seven days, that—I'm being told that may not Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 be adequate. Is that a correc t understanding of the 
2 checklist? 
3 MR. PARRY: The way, as I understood it, that Neil 
4 Richardson had it, was that when he's working with a client, 
5 I they do it in stages. Most of those stages have been 
6 accomplished. What needs to be done now is the final 
7 drawings are drawn. 
8 MR- JARDINE: All I'm—well, I (inaudible). 
9 MR. PARRY: Well, I'm not agreeing to the stages. 
10 THE COURT: What you1 re agreeing to is the final 
11 drawings will all be presented? 
12 MR. PARRY: That's correct. 
13 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
14 | MR* PARRY: And it's, you know (inaudible). 
15 I UNIDENTIFIED: (Inaudible), 
16 MR- JARDINE: I don't know what—I think—I would say 
17 I this, Your Honor, they€re a little concerned that my saying 
18 if we get all the 6ets of plans at once, seven days may be 
19 slightly ambitious, 
20 THE COURT: Right. That's— 
21 MR, JARDINE: We could have like 14, and I'd like to be 
22 fl honest with you, my client was just—had in mind—and I 
23 | think, sort of fairly, that they would see the site plan 
24 fi before they saw the final plan, which is sort of a staging 
25 I concept, but I 6aid to them, that's up to Mr, Ward, and if I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
he wants to submit it all at once, there may be benefit in 
submitting— 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. JARDINE: —one of those first, but that's his 
call, not ours, but we will need maybe slightly more than 
seven days to review it. 
THE COURT: Okay- Well, I'm (inaudible). 
MR. PARRY: The (inaudible) last night. 
THE COURT: That's not going to create any problem if 
they1 re—if you have the plans within seven days from now. 
MR. PARRY: Oh, no, no, it'll—how long will it take 
you to do them? 
MR. SHAW: Well, the sub-plan would be the most 
important drawing, and that's actually a good idea to submit 
that as soon as possible and then continue (inaudible). 
MR. PARRY: Okay. One of the things we discussed last 
night, because we had the two architects together, was that 
really this was not going to be a 'let's just pack up and 
leave each other and ignore each other for a month/ but 
that they could be working together and making sure things 
are acceptable during thi6 whole time period. I don't see 
it as just dumping a set of plans on them in 30 days. 
MR. JARDINE: I would say thi6, Your Honor, we're 
willing to review plans along the way, like the 6ite plan, 
25 B when we get them, and we turn then around in a reasonable Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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time frame, and if we could have—if that happens — 
THE COURT: How about not less that 14 daye? 
MR. JARDINE: From the time we get the plans? Yes, 
MR. PARRY: That's okay. 
THE COURT: On any plans that are submitted. That 
seems to be reasonable, and then don't just send them all at 
once, send them as soon as they're done. 
MR. PARRY: They'll certainly do that. 
THE COURT: Teah, okay. All right. 
MR. PARRY: The 22nd and 23rd is okay with us, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: April 22nd and 23rd? 
MR. JARDINE: Do you have a week later? No, no, that— 
THE COURT: I have the 29th and 30th, but I have a 
three-day jury trial starting on Wednesday the 28th. ' 
MR. PARRY: Mr. Shaw said that he could get them done 
by the 7th, so that would give us 14 days. 
MR. JARDINE: I'll keep the 22nd or the 23rd, it was a 
(inaudible)-
THE COURT: Well, I can go to May 6th or 7th. 
MR. JARDINE: I think they1re worried about that 
bumping into the 30 days they think it takes to get to the 
county, so— 
MR. PARRY: And since—yes, we're the ones who are 
asserting the pressure. We'll put pressure on cretMnrr tihe 
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plans done. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I might say, you've asserted 
pressure for about three years, and you haven't been a part 
of it, but I'm not any longer sensitive to your pressure on 
that, in that respect, because I've had enough of it- S o — 
MR. PARRY: I was hoping that we wouldn't get into--
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. PARRY: —those types of things. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JARDINE: Let me ask, Your Honor, we have— 
THE COURT: Well, here's the problem. I have a three-
day jury trial set on the 28th, right now. It's a ^96 case, 
I. don't know anything more than its number—I except it will 
go. 
MR. PARRY: We said we'd meet the 22nd, we'd meet that 
day. 
MR. JARDINE: I'm just getting a conflict here from Mr. 
Hagen. I would— 
THE COURT: That you have? 
MR. JARDINE: No, that we have for the 22nd. If there 
was a chance we could—if you could—if we could call back 
and call the lawyers on that three-day trial and, if it 
looks like it has a chance of settling, have the 29th and 
30th as a — 
" THE COURT: I'll give you the 29th and 30th ricrht now— Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
it's just that I may have to deal with it. 
MR. JARDINE: I understand, Your Honor. I'm sorry, 
it's a conflict with my client, 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JARDINE: So, if we could hold that and we'll find 
out from Taunie who the (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, don't worry about that right now. I 
don't want that. I mean, let them settle their own case. 
MR. JARDINE: All right. 
THE COURT: Your number is 94 anyway, so I would normal 
try it ahead of another one, except that this has been moved 
so many times, I may not have quite the sympathy that I 
might have had previously, and I don't mean to be unkind 
about that* 
MR. PARRY: All right. 
THE COURT: Because I have now three days that are just 
given back to me, and I don't have another case in those 
three days, which is not very happy—you know, even though I 
might have other things to do, I do have plenty to do, but 
it's not a very happy thing to save those days for you and 
gotten the other cases cleared out. Okay, that's enough, in 
that respect. 
Have you stated your stipulation to your satisfaction/ 
Mr. Jardine? 
MR. JARDINE: I have. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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THE COURT: Mr, Parry, do you concur? 
MR- PARRY: Y e s . 
THE COURT: All right. Let's have—who, on behalf of 
Brighton Corporation, should be placed under oath? 
MR. JARDINE: Mrs- Barton-
THE COURT: All right- Will you stand and raise your 
right hand, please? And, Mr. Ward, will you likewise stand 
and raise your right hand, please? 
COURT CLERK: Do you and each of you solemnly swear the 
testimony you're about to give in the case before the Court 
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God? 
MRS. BARTON: Yes. 
MR. WARD: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. You've heard the statement of 
the stipulation by your attorney and also by Mr. Parry. Do 
you agree to the terms and conditions of this stipulation 
and agree to implement them? 
MRS- BARTON: Yes-
THE COURT: All right. Likewise, you've heard the 
statement of the stipulation now concurred and by all, 
including Brighton Corporation. Do you agree to the terms 
and conditions, of the stipulation and to implement them, 
Mr. Ward? 
MR. WARD: Yes, yes. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 || THE COURT: Thank you each- All right, based then upon 
2 f| that stipulation, the Court will strike the trial date 
3 II anticipating, hopefully, that the whole matter will be 
4 resolved upon this stipulation- The Court has continued a 
5 J) trial date, in anticipation that the matter will be 
6 II resolved, however, to April 29th and 30th, if needed, for the 
7 trial. All right? 
8 MR* JARDINE: Thank you, Your Honor-
9 THE COURT: Thank you each for your appearances -
10 Court's in recess-
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James S. Jardine (1647) 
Scott A. Hagen (4840) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, #500 
P. O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
(801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M. 
COATS, individually and as Trustees of 
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated 
December 10, 1985, GREGORY M. 
WARD, an individual, DOUG'S TREE 
SERVICE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and UNKNOWN PERSONS designated 
as JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO 
PAVE PRIVATE ROADWAY 
Civil No. 940905453 
Judge David S. Young 
This matter came on for a pretrial conference before the Honorable David S. Young on 
September 8, 1999. James S. Jardine and Scott A. Hagen appeared as counsel for Plaintiff 
F'tEO DISTINCT COURT 
' nird Judicial District 
SALW*K*6ouNTY 
By V 
Deputy Clerk 
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Brighton Corporation. Douglas J. Parry appeared as counsel on behalf of Defendant Gregory 
Ward. During the conference, counsel for the parties discussed Brighton Corporation's request 
to pave the existing dirt roadway that crosses Defendant Gregory Ward's property, pursuant to 
a recorded easement, and leads to Brighton's property. The parties discussed the location of 
the roadway, the parties' agreement to amend the legal description of the recorded easement to 
include the physical location of the road, and Ward's objection that Brighton should only be 
allowed to pave the roadway if it moves its waterline from its present location into the 
roadway. 
The Court, having determined that the waterline is placed within a separate easement 
and that paving the roadway would promote safety and not increase the burden on Ward's 
property, concluded that Brighton's request for paving the roadway was reasonable. The 
Court further determined that the paving should proceed immediately because of the 
approaching winter season. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Brighton Corporation may 
immediately proceed to pave the existing private roadway. 
DATED this J/<&y of September, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
i J ^ CIIUAJULJ 
Hon. Dav; 
District (fourt Jydge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ALLOWING 
PLAINTIFF TO PAVE PRIVATE ROADWAY was hand-delivered, on this °\ day of 
September, 1999 to the following: 
Douglas J. Parry, Esq. 
James K. Tracy, Esq. 
PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
60 East South Temple, #1270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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James S. Jardine (1647) 
Scott A. Hagen (4840) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, #500 
P. O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
(801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M. 
COATS, individually and as Trustees of 
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated 
December 10, 1985, GREGORY M. 
WARD, an individual, DOUG'S TREE 
SERVICE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and UNKNOWN PERSONS designated 
as JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING BRIGHTON'S 
MOTION TO ENFORCE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Civil No. 940905453 
Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiff Brighton Corporation's ("Brighton") Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
came before the Court for hearing on October 22, 1999. James S. Jardine and Scott A. Hagen 
appeared as counsel on behalf of behalf of Brighton Corporation. Douglas J. Parry and James 
K. Tracy appeared as counsel on behalf of Defendant Gregory M. Ward. 
PLED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
k-rw ^ 3 399 
"S/jLT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy (Berk 
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Based on the legal memoranda, including exhibits, filed by both parties in support of 
their respective positions, and based on oral argument presented by counsel for both parties, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. the stipulation stated by counsel on the record on March 3, 1999 and affirmed by 
the parties under oath, including the documents referenced in that oral stipulation, comprise a 
binding and enforceable contract which is binding on the parties. 
2. That contract sets forth the criteria for Mr. Ward's submission of plans to Brighton 
Corporation and Brighton Corporation's review of plans submitted by Mr. Ward. 
3. Accordingly, the issue to be decided at trial on November 17, and 18, 1999, is 
whether the plans submitted by Mr. Ward after the hearing on March 3, 1999 complied with 
the criteria stated in the March 3, 1999 stipulation and incorporated letters. 
4. Based on the foregoing, Brighton Corporation's Motion to Enforce Settlement is 
hereby granted. 
O U V 
DATED this <D day of£ctebefTT999. 
BYTHECOUU. r r •„ 
Hon. David 
District Cou 
Approved as to form: 
PARRY, ANDERSONjSr, MANSFIELD 
Doughi^J. Parry 
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Scott A. Hagen (4840) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, #500 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
(801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M. 
COATS, individually and as Trustees of 
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated 
December 10, 1985, GREGORY M. 
WARD, an individual, DOUG'S TREE 
SERVICE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and UNKNOWN PERSONS designated 
as JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 940905453 
Judge David S. Young 
This matter came before the Court for bench trial on November 17, 18 and 19, 1999, 
the Honorable David S. Young presiding. The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses 
and examined the exhibits presented by Plaintiff Brighton Corporation and Defendant Gregory 
M. Ward, now issues the following order, which incorporates the Court's findings of fact. 
01690 
FILED QESTR&T $"POT 
Third Judicial District 
>Hf SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ny ^ 
Deputy Clerk 
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1. The parties have entered into a binding settlement agreement that is comprised 
of (a) the transcript of hearing dated March 3, 1999, (b) the letter dated October 28, 1998 from 
James S. Jardine to Brent D. Ward, (c) the letter dated February 22, 1999 from James S. 
Jardine to Douglas J. Parry, and (d) two checklists made up of (i) the "Initial Preliminary Plan 
Checklist" and (ii) the "Construction Document Checklist." The checklists are the first six 
pages of trial exhibit 4-p. The terms of the settlement are stated in those documents, except 
that there are three exceptions to application of the Checklists as stated in the hearing on 
March 3, 1999. 
2. The plans at issue in this trial, which were submitted to Brighton Corporation 
for review in June 1999, did not comply with the settlement agreement. Accordingly, 
Brighton Corporation properly rejected those plans. Brighton correctly determined that the 
plans submitted in October 1999 were not properly presented for review and did not review 
them. Accordingly, those plans were not considered during the trial. 
3. There was inadequate communication between the parties, which the Court finds 
was principally caused by Ward. In particular, the Court finds that both Ward and his 
architect, Kimble Shaw, knew that the plans submitted to Brighton Corporation in June 1999 
were not final plans, but neither Ward nor Shaw ever advised Brighton of that fact, even after 
receiving Brighton's rejection letter dated June 23, 1999, which made clear that Brighton 
believed it had reviewed (and rejected) final plans. 
4. The Court finds, based on Mary Barton's scheduled medical treatment out of the 
area and on Defendant's stipulation that a four-month period of repose was reasonable under 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the circumstances, that Brighton is entitled to a period of repose from November 19, 1999 until 
April 1, 2000, during which no plans shall be submitted to Brighton for review. 
5. Brighton requested, pursuant to the settlement agreement, that Ward remove all 
plans currently on file or in the possession of Salt Lake County building and zoning authorities. 
The parties are to determine the effect of removing the plans and either remove them or apply 
to the Court for further guidance on that issue. 
DATED this 3 - day of December, 199$ 
BY THE COURT: 
Hon. Davi< 
District Coi 
Approved as to form: 
PARRY, ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
Douglas J. Parry 
James K. Tracy 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage 
prepaid, on this Y - day of December, 1999 to the following: 
Douglas J. Parry, Esq. 
James K. Tracy, Esq. 
PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
60 East South Temple, #1270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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•ADMITTED IN CALIFORNIA ONLY 
Brent D. Ward, Esq. 
PARRY LAWRENCE & WARD 
60 E. South Temple, #1270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Brighton Corporation v. Ward 
Dear Brent: 
As I indicated to you in our telephone conversation of last week, Brighton Corporation has 
decided to make one last effort to resolve the ongoing dispute before proceeding to motions1 and trial in 
this case. I will not repeat all of the issues that have built up and which are set out in prior letters, 
except to note that the recent discovery by Brighton Corporation that since April 1996 Mr. Ward has 
been seeking approval from Salt Lake County Development Services not only for the Chalet Plan but 
also for the Designer and Cottage Plans, all of which are now on file at the County, has added to the 
skepticism of my clients. 
On behalf of Brighton Corporation, we offer to resolve all issues and approve the Chalet Plan on 
the following principles: 
1
 As I have indicated, and so there is no question, by proceeding with this proposal Brighton Corporation is not abandoning or waiving 
in any way its position that it is entitled to have Mr. Ward either have the plans signed and verified by an architect or reimburse 
Brighton Corporation for its expenses and professional fees in reviewing further plans. If we fail to reach agreement, then we will 
proceed to file our motion for partial summaiy jdugment that requiring verification by an ardiitect and reimburement of reviewing 
expenses is reasonable. We are also considering including as a ground for that motion that consideration of the standards of the 
Foothill Canyons Overlay Zone is reasonable. 
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1. We wish to resolve gH issues that now or may exist between these parties, so that to the 
fullest extent possible there is no risk of future litigation between them except with respect to 
compliance with the Court's Orders. There should be no ambiguities or open issues in the final 
resolution. 
2. Any settlement must be fully and completely documented and incorporated in an order of 
the Court that includes all approved plans, with continuing jurisdiction in the Court to monitor 
compliance with the order and with a reasonable right in Brighton Corporation to inspect for 
compliance. 
In proposing this resolution, Brighton Corporation has considered and re-examined only the 
Chalet plans of June 3, 1998. Based on those plans, Brighton Corporation would give its approval and 
resolve this entire issue only if the following changes were made or conditions were met (most or all of 
which are not new). Brighton Corporation has highlighted points on the maps and site plans, copies of 
which are included, which must be removed, as well as inconsistencies in the plans that must be 
corrected. 
1. FRONT PORCH ON NORTH 
We have repeatedly asked for detailed drawings of how Mr. Ward proposed to accomplish the 
design and placement of a porch on the north side of the cabin, as Brighton Corporation has been 
skeptical that it could be done. To date we have not received the requested detailed drawings. 
We do not believe that the entire north side of the cabin can be graded down to the 116' 
elevation shown on the topography map, so that the floor of the porch and the steps leading up to the 
porch can be placed lower than the first floor of the cabin, which has been agreed upon and set at 116' 
10:" Cutting the mountainside down as much as five feet, then trying to hold it with a retaining wall on 
the east and grading away from the north side of the porch is not feasible. This is not placing the cabin 
into the slope of the mountain, but rather cutting down the mountain to fit in a porch. This is also 
important because of the very real potential impact on Brighton Corporation's waterline. 
Brighton Corporation has suggested that the cabin be entered from the east side of the cabin into 
the second floor, which, particularly in the winter, would provide an easy access to the cabin from the 
circular driveway and parking, or from the patio on the west side of the cabin. 
2. BRIGHTON CORPORATION'S WATERLINE AND EASEMENT 
The existence and present location of Brighton Corporation's waterline and easement must be 
confirmed so there is no future dispute about it. 
Brighton Corporation's waterline has never been moved, only lowered into the ground, and 
extended by Silver Lake Company to reach their new main line. Mr. Ward has shown Brighton 
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Corporation's waterline in several different locations on different maps and site plans, none correctly. 
Given these issues, Sneidman and Assoc, with the help of Steve Jorgenson, Silver Lake Company 
watermaster, prepared a survey in June 1994. As part of the resolution, the parties must agree on the 
accuracy of that survey, and Mr. Ward will remove any notations from any plans he has submitted or 
will submit to the County or other agencies questioning in any way the right or location of that 
easement. The notations made by Kirk Morgan of Sneidman & Assoc, and Steve Jorgenson, 
watermaster, are the only notes concerning Brighton Corporation's waterline that may appear on any 
site plan included with final plans. 
Finally, the proposed waterline to Mr. Ward's cabin must be located further south than Brighton 
Corporation's valve connection to the Silver Lake line. Mr. Ward must document the exact location of 
his waterline and valve, as directed or approved by Mr. Jorgenson. 
3. WARD/COATS SEWER LINE 
The words, "Brighton Corporation disputed sewer line placed Aug 1997 outside provided 
easement" is to be removed from all site plans. Brighton Corporation's sewer line was placed by 
Solitude Improvement District within the easement as shown on "Grant of Easement for Construction 
and Maintenance" dated May 6, 1994. 
No provision was made in the Special Warranty Deed or Property Use Agreement for 
Ward/Coats utilities to be placed in the right-of-way running along Forest Alley (vacated). Dransfield's 
utilities are located in the north side of the easement, Brighton Corporation's sewer line on the south 
side, and the center portion is for utilities that will be installed on the property between Dransfield's and 
Brighton Corporation's at some future time. 
- Mr. Ward's sewer line should be shown on site plans running along the west end of his property 
from the cabin to the main sewer connection on Prospect Ave. It thus would run beneath Brighton 
Corporation's waterline at one point only, and that should be at the west end of Brighton Corporation's 
waterline. 
Mr. Ward will need to provide Brighton Corporation with a "Grant of Easement for 
Construction and Maintenance" issued by Solitude Improvement District to him, showing the exact 
location of his sewer line. 
4. PATIO 
In reviewing the proposed patio in the June 3, 1998 plans, Brighton Corporation understands the 
proposal to include a very substantial excavation of the ground on the south to accommodate the 
proposed patio. Brighton Corporation cannot approve such a disturbance to the land. 
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Brighton Corporation does not approve 758 square feet of concrete, or almost 2/3 the size of 
the entire cabin, for a patio as proposed in your letter of June 3, 1998. Although the Special Warranty 
Deed specifically calls for decking, in the meeting of January 1997 in Neil Richardson's office, Brighton 
Corporation agreed to allow Greg to use a concrete patio rather than wood decking if the area on the 
south was cut down approximately one-third. That was discussed by the architects in order to avoid a 
deep cut of over eight feet in the mountain. Greg has not complied with his part of the agreement. 
The patio on the south of the cabin may be 25 X 12 feet, or 3 00^  square feet. This would 
necessitate only a 4-5 foot high retaining wall, without grading the ground in any significant way, 
instead of an 8-9 foot high retaining wall. This amount would be in addition to the concrete patio on 
the west of the cabin which is shown as 29 feet X 10 feet, or 290 square feet. This is a total of 590 
square feet of cement patio, or half again the square footage of the cabin, plus 48 square feet of decking 
off the second floor. 
5. PARKING 
The site plan shows two proposed areas for parking located east of the circular driveway with 
the inaccurate note "existing parking." The proposed parking is located in the Buffer Zone, which may 
not be used for parking, as outlined in the Property Use Agreement. Parking must be on or west of the 
circular driveway. 
6. SET OF EXTERIOR ELEVATION DRAWINGS AND ELEVATIONS 
Drawings of the front, rear, and both sides of the chalet cabin showing the relationship of the 
cabin to the existing topography of the land must be submitted to Brighton Corporation. These 
drawings are to be the same type of drawings that have been submitted with other plans delivered to 
Brighton Corporation in December 1993, March 1994, July 1995 and August 1995. We have not 
received the exterior elevation drawings with any of the Chalet plans, though we have asked for them 
several times. 
The drawings of the contour of the land should, of course, be the same as previous elevation 
drawings made by Kimble Shaw, but the position of the cabin will be different as the Chalet is built into 
the slope of the mountain with the upper surface of the first floor at 116' 10M, and with no basement. 
As a result, the drawings will show the southeast corner of the upper surface of the first floor 7-8 
feet into the ground, the northeast corner 4-5 feet into the ground, with as little disturbance to the 
existing grade as possible. This would be in addition to the footings and crawl space which are under 
the first floor. We have agreed that the ceiling of the first floor of the cabin may be 9 feet in height if 
the first floor of the cabin is built on grade on the west and into the slope of the mountain. 
m 
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7. TOPOGRAPHY MAP AND SURVEY 
As part of any final set of plans, Mr. Ward must include a copy of the original Francom 
Topography Map showing the 2f contour intervals across the south side of the property. As Francom 
did not include Brighton Corporation's waterline on the topography map, Mr. Ward should include the 
transparent copy of the Sneidman Survey in the exact scale as the topography map showing the 
relationship of Brighton Corporation's waterline, the circular driveway, buffer zone, and present parking 
area, which can be superimposed onto the topography map. 
A footprint of the cabin and patio should be drawn on the map using a dotted line or another 
method that does not obscure the contour lines on the map. 
8. ROADWAY 
As previously discussed, as part of the resolution, the legal description of the road should be 
changed to match the physical location of the road maintaining the 20' width. In addition, Brighton 
Corporation may proceed to asphalt the road for safety and emergency vehicle access. 
9. ADDITIONAL ITEMS 
a. There needs to be a clear definition of the meaning of the phrase, "construction grade 
116", which appears at numerous places in the plans. This is ambiguous. 
b. All necessary corrections should be made to Techni-Graphic Services sheets 1-5 for front 
porch, retaining walls, patio, doorways, etc. On sheet 5, the elevation of the patio should be given with 
the other elevations, and the height of the crawl space should be given as "36" maximum," instead of 
"36"min." 
c. Several corrections need to be made to the General Notes which are included as the last 
page of the plans. 
(i) The words "which is to be no higher than 36" should be added to #13, which 
refers to the crawl space. 
(ii) #37 reads: "Smoke detectors required at each bedroom, at hallways leading to 
bedrooms, at every floor level, at the top of each stairway on any floor without bedrooms, and 
in rooms serving bedrooms where the ceiling height of the room is 24" or more greater in height 
than the bedroom served from such room." As the cabin is to have only two floors with no loft 
or basement, and as your plans show one set of stairs and bedrooms on the 2nd floor only, this 
note is ambiguous and should be corrected. 
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(iii) OTHER reads: "No stumps, roots or vegetation shall be removed from the soil 
of B/C's waterline easement except as may be necessary for placement of utilities, water and 
sewer." The word 'organic material' should be added after the word "vegetation", and the 
words "except as may be necessary for placement of utilities, water and sewer" must be omitted. 
d. Brighton Corporation was not given a copy of the "Support Documents for Gregory M. 
Ward Cabin", which are attached to the Chalet Plans at Salt Lake County Development Services. Mr. 
Ward will need to correct each page of this document to bring it into conformity, and submit a copy to 
Brighton Corporation for approval. 
The first page, which is Mr. Ward's letter of August 18, 1998 to Development Services for 
Planning and Zoning, notes that he is enclosing (12) site plans showing electrical-water-sewer service 
on the property. At the present time there is no electrical, water, or sewer services on the property. 
This needs to be corrected or explained. 
The August 18 letter also indicates that he is enclosing two copies of the building plan 
elevations. We think these must have been the copies of the Cottage Plan elevations which we found in 
the file with the Chalet plans. The two sets of plans are not interchangeable for Brighton Corporation's 
review. 
In that letter, Greg also includes three maps to show "Drainage," "Course of Construction 
Fencing," and "Area of Ground Disturbance/Grading." Parking is shown in the two areas of the buffer 
zone. The position of the sewer line and water lines need to be corrected. Construction fencing must 
run the entire west side of the buffer zone and must run along the south side of Brighton Corporation's 
waterline easement except where the easement is across the circular driveway. The enclosed map 
showing ground disturbance/grading is highlighted in yellow showing those areas where there may not 
be any grading and which must experience as little disturbance as possible. 
It also appears that a "color board for exterior finish" was included with the Support Document 
submitted to the County August 18, 1998. Mr. Ward has not given Brighton Corporation this material, 
but as this is a part of the design of the cabin, this also needs to be submitted for approval to Brighton 
Corporation. In the past, we have indicated that this will likely not be an issue for Brighton 
Corporation. 
CONCLUSION 
All of the drawings and documents requested must be furnished. Each item noted as incorrect 
must be remedied as outlined. All additions, deletions, and adjustments must be addressed and 
incorporated into a complete and truthful set of plans. After Mr. Ward has made the necessary 
corrections, Neil Richardson will be asked to verify them for accuracy. If approved we will prepare a 
settlement agreement based on the plans. Once the Court has entered an Order, Mr. Ward may then 
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submit those Court-approved plans to Salt Lake County Development Services for a building permit in 
place of the three plans, which are now on file there. 
If the plans are not corrected in every detail as we have suggested, and all drawings and 
documents are not submitted as requested, approval cannot be given. 
We hope this proposal will result in a resolution. Given the history, Brighton Corporation does 
not want to negotiate these points. However, I certainly am willing to clarify any aspect of this letter. 
We look forward to hearing from you. 
Very truly yours, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
A""~£nTames S. Jardine 
cc: Sam Clark 
433379 
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February 22, 1999 
Douglas J. Parry, Esq. 
PARRY, LAWRENCE & WARD 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Brighton Corporation v. Ward 
Dear Doug: 
I am writing on behalf of Brighton Corporation in response to your letter of February 5, 
1999, and with respect to the plans that accompanied that letter. I also acknowledge our 
subsequent receipt of two additional drawings last week that you advised me are "corrected" 
drawings prepared by Kimble Shaw. Additionally, on February 18, 1999, we received an 
additional 13 (thirteen) pages of plans that we understand are a duplicate of the plans already 
provided on February 5, with red dots marking your ameliorative changes, along with an 
accompanying letter of explanation. Brighton Corporation has carefully reviewed the plans 
signed by Kimble Shaw and consulted with Neil Richardson, a licensed architect, and has 
directed me to respond on its behalf. For the reasons set out below, Brighton Corporation does 
not approve these plans. 
1. The Plans are Incomplete and Lack Necessary Detail. The plans do not comply 
with the Court's grant of Brighton Corporation's recent motion for partial summary judgment. 
The Court's order provides that Brighton Corporation may require, as a condition of further 
review, that the plans be signed by a licensed architect. The plans Brighton Corporation received 
include only three drawings signed by Kimble Shaw and those three drawings contain little of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the detail Brighton Corporation needs to remove the ambiguity from the plans. Although you 
have objected that there is not enough time for Shaw to prepare a complete set of plans, this 
requirement was first imposed in a letter dated June 10, 1998, and was verbally requested long 
before then. In fact, it was initially suggested by Judge Young approximately one year ago. 
The plans that were prepared and signed by Kimble Shaw are not sufficiently detailed for 
Brighton Corporation to determine whether they are acceptable. For example, Brighton 
Corporation has consistently requested that Ward provide a site plan with contour lines that are 
clearly labeled with correct elevations. The site plan should include the exact elevation of each 
outside corner of the structure (including the base of retaining walls and footings). Elevation 
drawings must also include exact elevations for each outside corner. Moreover, the elevation 
drawings must include the architect's rendering of how the building fits into the existing grade 
on all four sides. The heavy black line on the elevations signed by Shaw is insufficiently 
detailed for Brighton to make its determination. The original plans considered by the Court in 
September 1994 showed how the cabin would fit into the existing landscape. These elevations 
do not include that detail and for those reasons, among others, the submitted plans are 
unacceptable. 
2. The Plans do not Adequately Clarify the North Porch. The plans do not show 
how a porch and the main entrance can be placed on the north side of the building without an 
excessive cut in the mountain and disturbance to Brighton Corporation's wateriine and wateriine 
easement. This issue is complicated by Ward's failure to submit plans that are sufficiently 
detailed. The lack of contour lines and exact elevations, as well as the failure to include a 
drawing showing how the porch and entryway fit into existing grade, makes it impossible for 
Brighton Corporation to determine whether the structure will disturb its wateriine. This issue has 
been discussed in several letters in the past. It is critical that Kimble Shaw address this issue 
with a detailed and specific drawing. 
Brighton Corporation continues to believe that the entrance should be moved to the east 
side of the cabin at the second floor level or to the patio on the west side. Either option avoids 
the difficulties caused by trying to force a north-side entrance. 
3. The Patio on the South Side may require an Excessive Cut. The patio on the 
south and west sides of the cabin is too large and may require an excessive cut in the mountain. 
Brighton Corporation does not approve 758 square feet of concrete, or almost 2/3 the size of the 
entire cabin, for a patio as stated in your plans. The Special Warranty Deed calls for decking, 
not a concrete patio. In January 1997, the architects discussed reducing the size of the patio by 
one-third in the southeast corner in order to reduce the size of the retaining wall that would be 
required in the southeast corner. The plans ignore this consensus. Moreover, Kimble Shaw's 
drawings do not address the patio in any detail. As with the porch on the north side, this 
prevents Brighton Corporation from being able to determine whether the cut in the mountain is 
excessive. A retaining wall of more than six feet would violate the standards set out in the 
Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone. Brighton Corporation suggests now, as it has in the past, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that the patio on the south be reduced from 39 x 12 to 25 x 12, which would necessitate a much 
smaller cut in the mountain and still provide for a very sizeable patio. In the alternative, the 
patio could be stepped down as it runs west along the south side of the cabin. 
As Brighton Corporation has indicated many times, detailed and complete plans signed 
by an architect are necessary to avoid any further disputes should acceptable plans ultimately be 
approved by Brighton Corporation. Such plans would then be available for inclusion in a court 
order and for clear and objective compliance and enforcement thereof. 
Brighton Corporation did not review all of the drawings submitted. In keeping with our 
prior motion and the Court's direction, Brighton reviewed only those drawings signed by Mr. 
Shaw. For the reasons stated above, those drawings are not acceptable to Brighton Corporation. 
Very truly yours, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
James S. Jardine 
cc: Brighton Corporation 
451275 
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F I L E D 
OCT - 7 1999 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT U T A H 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M. 
COATS, individually and as Trustees of 
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated 
December 10, 1985, GREGORY M. 
WARD, an individual, DOUG'S TREE 
SERVICE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and UNKNOWN PERSONS designated 
as JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10, 
Defendants/Petitioners. 
RESPONSE TO GREGORY M. 
WARD'S PETITION FOR 
EMERGENCY EXTRAORDINARY 
WRIT DIRECTED TO 
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG, 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 990845 
Plaintiff/Respondent Brighton Corporation ("Brighton") files this Response to 
Defendant/Petitioner Gregory M. Ward's ("Ward") Petition for Emergency Extraordinary 
Writ Directed to Judge David S. Young, Third District Court, State of Utah ("Petition"). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Petition should be denied. First, the paving of the private roadway in question was 
completed before the Petition was filed. Therefore, the requested writ cannot prevent the 
identified harm and there is no purpose in providing emergency relief. Second, trial is set for 
November 17-18, 1999 in the district court. After trial, Mr. Ward will have either a judgment 
in his favor or an appealable judgment in favor of Brighton. Therefore, Ward has a plain, 
speedy, and adequate remedy through a statutory appeal. In addition, and in any event, the 
district court did not err in either of the rulings challenged by Ward. 
Finally, this Petition is another effort by Petitioner, who is now on his third lawyer and 
who unsuccessfully sought to recuse the trial judge in 1997, to burden Brighton Corporation 
with excessive litigation rather than comply with the restrictive covenants and meet Brighton's 
reasonable objections. 
RESPONSE TO WARD'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Brighton responds as follows to Ward's statement of facts1: 
1. Brighton agrees that Ward owns the Property. 
2. Brighton agrees that the Property is burdened by restrictions in the Special 
Warranty Deed, and that those restrictions limit construction to a small cabin of two floors not 
exceeding 1,200 square feet per floor. Furthermore, the restrictions are for the benefit of the 
grantor, Brighton. 
1
 For the Court's convenience and ease of reference, Brighton has numbered its responsive paragraphs to 
correspond to the paragraph numbers of Ward's Petition. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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3. Brighton agrees that the Special Warranty Deed provides it a further right of 
discretionary review, subjection to the condition that such discretion be exercised reasonably 
and in good faith. Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 449 P.2d 361, 362-63 (Colo. 1969) (citing 
cases). 
4. Brighton agrees that the Property is also burdened by a Property Use 
Agreement, which refers to Brighton's 20-foot roadway easement as a "single lane gravel 
road." 
5. Brighton agrees that Ward submitted plans to Brighton for its review in 1994. 
However, Brighton rejected the plans because they did not comply with the restrictive 
covenants. After Ward began construction activities without Brighton's consent, Brighton 
instituted this action to stop the construction. 
6. Brighton agrees that as a result of the initial two-day hearing on its request for 
injunctive and declaratory relief, the court found that Ward's plans contained four floors, not 
the two permitted. The court determined that the plans Ward submitted to Brighton were 
"intentionally ambiguous as to the type of structure actually being proposed, and as to its 
placement on the Subject Property." Order Granting Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory 
Judgment dated October 4, 1994 ("1994 Order") at 1l3.b. (copy attached hereto as Exh. A). 
In fact, Ward's architect, Kimble Shaw, admitted that he had been instructed to design the 
cabin with an additional floor but not to show it on the plans. Mr. Shaw also admitted that the 
purported "attic" featured an open overlook common in lofts, and that he had never designed 
such an overlook for an attic. In interpreting the Special Warranty Deed, the court found that 
2 
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the "'two floor' restriction was included with the intent that the two floors be similar to the 
original cabin on the property now owned by Brighton where the first floor was built into 
grade with the front door on the west side on grade." IdL at ^ 14. 
7. Brighton agrees that after the initial hearing it disapproved plans submitted on 
October 26, 1994, March 9, 1995, and May 1, 1995. The plans were presented as having only 
two floors, but in fact contained the same "loft overlook" that indicated the presence of a third 
floor in violation of the two-floor restriction in the Special Warranty Deed. Brighton's expert 
architect testified in a second hearing in 1995 that the plans were either incorrectly drawn or 
surreptitiously allowed for a basement, another violation of the restrictive covenants. Based on 
these arguments, the court determined that Brighton had not unreasonably withheld its 
approval. See Order Denying Application for Determination that Consent has been 
Unreasonably Withheld dated August 15, 1995 ( attached hereto as Exh. B). 
8. Brighton agrees that it disapproved plans submitted on various dates in 1995 and 
1996. In general, these plans were disapproved because the proposed structure was not built 
into the side of the mountain consistent with the district court finding as to the intent behind the 
restrictive covenants. Instead, the cabin was designed and set on the mountainside in such a 
manner as to have the ground floor not built into the slope but raised up, thus making it appear 
that a basement floor was necessary. Furthermore, the district court denied Ward's motion for 
an expedited hearing because Ward had requested an expedited hearing for the third successive 
year. Instead, the court ordered that the case would be set for trial on the merits. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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9. Brighton agrees that trial was postponed in 1998 because the parties were 
engaged in settlement negotiations. 
10. Brighton filed a motion for partial summary judgment on December 22, 1998, 
seeking a ruling that it was a reasonable condition of its review process for it (1) to charge 
Ward going forward for its professional costs of plan review, (2) to require that Ward's plans 
be signed by a licensed architect, and (3) to consider the standards of Salt Lake County zoning 
ordinances (specifically, the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone ) in reviewing Ward's plans. 
In so doing, Brighton hoped to discourage Ward from submitting essentially the same plans 
over and over again with little substantive change (as he had previously done), to increase the 
clarity and reliability of the plans, and to apply known, objective standards. 
11. Brighton agrees that the court was advised of the motion for partial summary 
judgment during a pretrial scheduling hearing and that after a discussion with counsel about the 
substance of the motion the court indicated it was "inclined" to grant it.2 However, the court 
also stated that it would schedule the motion for a hearing and that it would consider any brief 
filed and argument made by Ward. Affidavit of James S. Jardine at if 2 (attached hereto as 
Exh. C). 
12. Brighton agrees that the court invited Ward to file an opposition to the motion 
for partial summary judgment, though he also stated that the motion appeared to be well taken. 
Ward has no basis for contending that the court had already determined to grant the motion. 
2
 That Ward would complain about a court indicating a preliminary view but allowing full briefing and argument 
rights—a common occurrence to say the least—demonstrates the desperation and deficiency of this petition. 
4 
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13. Brighton agrees that Ward filed an opposition to the motion for partial summary 
judgment and participated in the hearing on the motion. After hearing argument from counsel 
for both parties, the court granted the motion. See Order Granting Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment dated March 3, 1999 (copy attached hereto as Exh. D). 
14. The court ruled that it was reasonable for Brighton to charge Ward for costs of 
professionals retained to assist in reviewing plans3 and to require that plans be signed by an 
architect. Brighton has sent Ward a bill for costs of reviewing plans. Ward has neither 
challenged nor paid the bill. 
15. Brighton objects to Ward's contention that paying Brighton's expenses of 
reviewing plans and having an architect draw the plans makes it "cost prohibitive" for Ward to 
submit additional plans. Ward's counsel has no foundation for his affidavit, which is the only 
evidence cited in support of this contention. Moreover, Ward has never before made this 
contention, which should have been made in opposition to the motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
16. With regard to the settlement agreement, Brighton agrees that Mr. Jardine made 
the statements quoted in the Petition, but that the portions quoted are taken out of context and 
do not reflect the actual agreement reached. Brighton objects to Ward's conclusion that the 
statements reflect that no settlement was made. 
3
 For example, up to the point of the motion, Brighton had incurred legal fees in excess of $60,000 in its review 
of Ward's proposed plans and in defending its review. 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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17. Brighton disapproved the plans that Ward submitted after March 3, 1999 
because the plans did not comply with the terms and standards of the settlement agreement. 
18. Brighton disputes Ward's characterization of its approval of his plans as a 
"condition precedent" to settlement. Approval of Ward's plans was necessary for dismissal of 
the entire case. The mere fact that the entire case was not settled on March 3, 1999, however, 
does not mean there was no agreement. The parties entered into an agreement on March 3, 
1999 that settled many issues in the case. The parties agreed on a new regime for reviewing 
plans, under which Ward was then to submit plans. If the plans were not approved by 
Brighton, then under the settlement agreement Ward was entitled to proceed to trial on the 
issue of whether the proposed plans conformed with the settlement agreement. 
19. Brighton objects to Ward's characterization of the August 5, 1999 letter from 
Brighton's counsel (copy attached hereto as Exh. E). The letter in fact disagreed with Ward's 
contention that there was no settlement agreement, but stated it was unlikely that the issue of 
whether there was an enforceable settlement agreement could be litigated in sufficient time to 
pave the road in 1999. For that reason, the letter observed that Brighton could "as a practical 
matter" only pave the road "this year" with Ward's consent. Ward's partial quote obscures 
the content of the letter by taking it out of context. 
20. Brighton then filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement (which 
authorized Brighton to pave the road), not to "contravene" the Property Use Agreement, which 
was superseded by the settlement agreement on the issue of paving the road. 
6 
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21. Ward's contention that paving will increase his construction costs is at best 
speculative. Many of the nearby roads are paved. In any event, paving has now been 
completed. 
22. Brighton agrees that the restrictive covenants are intended to preserve the rustic 
nature of the area, but principally for the benefit of Brighton, holder of the dominant tenement. 
Moreover, notwithstanding Ward's now professed concern for the rustic nature of the area, he 
agreed in open court as part of the settlement that the gravel road could be paved. 
23. Brighton contends that the cause of Ward's building delay is not Brighton's 
unreasonable withholding of consent, but is simply Ward's failure to comply with the 
settlement agreement. 
24. Brighton agrees that the motion to enforce the settlement agreement was served 
by mail on September 3, 1999 and that Ward's counsel received it on September 7, 1999, the 
day before the hearing. Brighton assumed Mr. Parry would receive it before the hearing and 
Brighton's attorneys were surprised when Mr. Parry stated (apparently without knowledge that 
it had been received by his office) that he had not. 
25. For purposes of this memorandum, Brighton does not dispute that Ward's 
counsel, Mr. Parry, had not seen the motion at the time of the hearing on September 8, 1999. 
26. During the hearing, counsel for both Ward and Brighton discussed Brighton's 
motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Brighton asked for an expedited hearing on that 
issue so that the paving, if approved, could take place before the onset of winter weather. 
Ward's counsel objected to a hearing later in September. The court then inquired into the 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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basis of the motion. Brighton's counsel explained it was based on the settlement agreement 
entered into in open court on March 3, 1999. Judge Young, who was present at the time of 
the settlement, asked about Ward's objection to paving the road. After hearing Ward's 
objections, and after Brighton's counsel explained paving was desired for safety reasons, the 
court granted the motion to enforce the settlement agreement on that issue. After the hearing, 
Ward submitted an "objection" to the proposed order, which addressed the merits of the 
motion to enforce the settlement agreement rather than the form of the order. The court 
overruled the objection and signed the order. See Order Allowing Plaintiff to Pave Private 
Roadway dated September 21, 1999 (copy attached hereto as Exh. F). 
27. Brighton agrees that it removed one tree to accomplish the paving. Before 
doing so, Brighton asked Ward, in writing, if he had an alternative proposal to save the tree. 
Letter from Scott A. Hagen to Douglas J. Parry dated September 9, 1999 (attached hereto as 
Exh. G). However, because it was in Brighton's easement, Brighton did not need to ask for 
permission to remove the tree. 
28. Brighton agrees the motion to enforce the settlement agreement has not yet been 
decided. 
8 
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BRIGHTON'S ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
29. This matter has been pending before the district court for five years. During 
that time, the district court held two evidentiary hearings and several additional motion 
hearings. The court has visited the property with the parties and their counsel to see the 
location of the road and the site of Ward's proposed cabin. The court was also present when 
the parties entered into a partial settlement agreement by stipulation in open court. 
30. In addition to submitting his original plans in July 1994, which the court found 
were "intentionally ambiguous," (see Order at if 13.b, Exh. A hereto) Ward has submitted 
several varying versions of these plans, each of which has been carefully reviewed by 
Brighton, as required by the Special Warranty Deed. At a cost of over $100,000, Brighton has 
engaged attorneys and architects to assist in reviewing the plans and then defending its review 
in court. 
31. Ward has also substituted counsel twice. Ward's substitution of new attorneys 
has added to Brighton's cost as Ward's new attorneys raise issues which were previously 
resolved. 
32. Brighton has also incurred significant litigation expenses in defending its 
decisions. These expenses have been increased by Ward's changes of counsel and his 
unsuccessful attempt to recuse Judge Young from hearing the case. 
33. Although Brighton has billed Ward for professional costs of reviewing plans 
since Judge Young's order of partial summary judgment in the amount of $5,446.50, he has 
paid nothing. Ward also notified Brighton that he is prepared to go to trial, not that he will be 
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submitting additional plans. Letter from Douglas J. Parry to James S. Jardine dated July 7, 
1999, at 1 (copy attached hereto as Exh. H). 
34. Trial of this case is set for November 17 and 18, 1999. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE WRIT SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE THE PAVING IS NOW 
COMPLETE AND THE CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL. ACCORDINGLY, WARD 
HAS NO NEED FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF. 
Ward claims he is entitled to seek and obtain this extraordinary relief because Brighton 
"is currently beginning to pave the roadway across his property," and paving will cause Ward 
"irreparable harm." Petition at 10-11. Ward is wrong on both counts. The paving was 
completed during the week of September 27, 1999. Accordingly, there is no longer any value 
in emergency relief. Furthermore, because trial is set for November 17 and 18, 1999, at 
which time Ward will either prevail or have an appealable final judgment, Ward has an 
adequate remedy. See Ogden City Corp. v. Adam, 635 P.2d 70, 71-72 (Utah 1981) ("an 
extraordinary writ will issue only 'where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy 
exists.'"); Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981) (common law writ of certiorari applies 
where issues cannot be addressed through statutory appeal). Accordingly, the Petition should 
be denied as to paving. 
Ward also has an adequate remedy for his claim that the district court erred in granting 
the motion for partial summary judgment. Ward has already declared that he is preparing for 
trial, not submitting additional plans. Accordingly, the courts ruling that it was reasonable for 
Brighton to charge Ward for professional costs incurred in plan review is not an actual 
10 
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impediment to Ward's submitting additional plans. Ward may simply go to trial and either 
prevail or obtain an appealable final judgment. He has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy -
his statutory right to appeal. Accordingly, this Court should decline to issue a writ to review 
either issue presented by Ward. 
II. EVEN IF WARD DID NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE AVENUE FOR REVIEW, 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN AUTHORIZING BRIGHTON TO 
PAVE THE ROADWAY. 
A. Ward Was Not Denied Due Process. 
Contrary to Ward's argument, he has been given notice of the motion to enforce the 
settlement agreement and an opportunity to respond, and therefore was not denied due process. 
Moreover, the issue of paving the road did not arise in a vacuum. This action is now over five 
years old. The district court is very familiar with the dispute, the parties, and the subject 
matter of this action. The district court has presided over two evidentiary hearings. On both 
occasions, he received testimony from the key witnesses, including Ward. The court has also 
physically inspected the property, including the roadway and the site of Ward's proposed 
cabin. Additionally, the settlement agreement at issue was entered into on the record in the 
district court's presence. Both parties were placed under oath, agreed to the terms, and 
promised to "implement" the agreement stated on the record. 
At the scheduled hearing on September 8, 1999, Brighton requested an expedited 
hearing on its motion because Brighton wanted to pave the road before the onset of cold 
weather. Ward's counsel objected to an early hearing date on the motion, so the court simply 
addressed the paving issue at that time. 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Ward's counsel stated his objections to the paving, including his contentions that there 
was no settlement agreement and that paving would increase Ward's construction costs. The 
court then heard Brighton's contention that paving the road was necessary for safety reasons 
because the cabin was being used in the winter. After hearing from both counsel, the court 
analyzed the location of the road (away from Ward's proposed cabin site) and discussed the 
effect of the settlement entered in his court on March 3, 1999. After doing so, the court 
determined that Brighton should be allowed to pave the road. 
After the motion was granted, Brighton prepared a proposed order. Ward filed a 
written objection that addressed the merits of the motion, not the form of the order. The court 
was presented with that objection and Brighton's response, and did not sign the order until 
after ruling on the objection. In short, the court was fully briefed by both sides on this issue 
before signing an order. This was not typical procedure, but given all of the circumstances, it 
was not such a departure as to deprive Ward of due process. As this court has stated, 
However, "due process" is not a technical concept with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place and circumstances which can be imprisoned within the 
treacherous limits of any formula. Rather the demands of due process rest on 
the concept of basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate 
to the case and just to the parties involved. 
Rupp. v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980). Ward had notice and an 
opportunity to respond, and has prospectively an adequate remedy. Under the circumstances, 
Ward was not denied due process. 
12 
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B. The Parties Entered Into a Binding Settlement Agreement that Authorized 
Paving the Roadway. 
The parties entered into a binding settlement agreement on March 3, 1999. Although 
counsel used the term "conditional settlement," it is clear that binding commitments were made 
and that the word "conditional" related to the fact that new plans had yet to be submitted and 
that approval by Brighton was conditional on receiving plans that met the standards of the 
settlement agreement. Ward agreed to the terms of two earlier letters from Brighton, one 
proposing settlement and the other identifying defects in the plans. Transcript of Hearing 
dated March 3, 1999 ("Trans.") at 4-5.4 Ward also agreed to follow two plan submittal 
checklists. Id Ward agreed to allow paving the roadway and to not dispute Brighton's 
18-foot wide waterline easement. Trans, at 10-11, 15. As stated in the earlier letters, 
Brighton agreed to allow Ward to substitute a concrete patio for the decking called for in the 
deed, to the size of the patio (to the extent it complied with county zoning rules), to nine-foot 
ceilings on the ground floor, and to allow a crawl space. Brighton also agreed that Ward's 
utility lines could cross into Brighton's waterline easement to the extent necessary and if 
allowed under applicable building codes. Trans, at 5-6, 12. The parties agreed to a schedule 
for plan submittal and review and reserved a trial date to litigate any plan rejection, if 
necessary. Trans, at 21-23. However, the stipulation as a whole was not negated if Brighton 
disapproved the plans. Rather, if the plans submitted were approved, the case could be 
4
 A copy of the transcript is attached to the Petition as Exhibit I. 
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dismissed; if the plans were not approved, litigation was to be over compliance with terms of 
the settlement agreement. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ALSO DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING THE MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. Brighton May Charge Ward for Costs Incurred in Plan Review. 
Ward argues the district court erred in ordering that it was reasonable for Brighton to 
charge Ward for its costs of plan review because "attorney fees are awardable only if 
authorized by statute or by contract." Petition at 17. This completely misstates the import of 
the district court order. The court did not order Ward to pay Brighton's litigation costs, but 
rather, on a going forward basis, determine that it was not unreasonable for Brighton to charge 
Ward for its costs in reviewing his plans. The Special Warranty Deed reserves in Brighton the 
right to review and approve Ward's plans, which approval may not be "unreasonably 
withheld." After more than four years of reviewing Ward's plans, Brighton had incurred tens 
of thousands of dollars in expenses and many hours of wasted time. The process could 
conceivably continue forever, with Brighton continuing to incur expenses from reviewing set 
after set of non-compliant plans. After a long period of reviewing plans without charge, it is 
not unreasonable for Brighton to charge for its expenses. The court did not err in so holding. 
B, Brighton's Request for Architect-Approval was Reasonable given Ward's 
Ambiguous Plans, 
The order holding that it was not unreasonable for Brighton to require that the plans 
submitted for its review be signed by an architect also was based on the unique circumstances 
of this case. Brighton's rejections of Ward's plans have been based, in part, on demonstrated 
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inconsistencies and ambiguities in the plans. Requiring an architect to sign the plans is a 
reasonable precaution intended to reduce the problem of ambiguity. Again, it is reasonable for 
Brighton to impose this requirement as a condition of review. 
CONCLUSION 
Ward is not entitled to extraordinary relief. The paving project has been completed and 
Ward does not intend to submit additional plans before trial. Moreover, trial is scheduled for 
November 17 and 18, 1999. Extraordinary relief is therefore unnecessary because Ward 
already has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. In any event, the district court has not 
erred. Accordingly, Brighton requests that the Petition be denied. 
DATED this l^W day of October, 1999. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
^ ^ 
Azshzs S. Jardk^ 
/ Scott A. Hao4/ 
isAttorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent Brighton 
Corporation 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO GREGORY 
M. WARD'S PETITION FOR EMERGENCY EXTRAORDINARY WRIT DIRECTED TO 
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG, THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH was mailed, 
postage prepaid, on this '"^4 day of October, 1999 to the following: 
Douglas J. Parry, Esq. 
PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
60 East South Temple, #1270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(ZtM. 
497269 
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